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Summary 
Persistence of inequality across generations is an important field of research with 
many implications in terms of policy. Economic inequality related to the 
intergenerational transmission of economic opportunities may strongly influence 
policies designed to reduce earnings or wealth concentration. Empirical research 
has usually focused on the intergenerational persistence of earnings or income, 
considered as good measures of differences in economic well-being and 
consumption capacity of individuals. On the contrary, only a limited number of 
recent studies attempt to estimate the degree of intergenerational mobility by using 
net wealth as a measure of economic status of individuals.  
This Ph.D thesis includes three autonomous chapters regarding the 
intergenerational persistence of wealth and earnings inequality and their 
mechanisms. The first one reviews research on wealth inequality and persistence 
across two or more generations. Broadly speaking, wealth is more unequally 
distributed than income and unlike other flow variables, may be transmitted across 
generations directly, by means of bequests or donations. This means that it may be 
a good proxy of permanent economic disparities. Unfortunately, measuring wealth 
is not an easy task since data on real and financial assets are incomplete and 
provided with many differences across countries.  
Regarding the extent of correlation in wealth across generations, only a limited 
number of studies are able to use suitable data on wealth which cover two or more 
generations. In any case, according to few recent empirical works, intergenerational 
rank correlations in wealth seem to be usually higher than intergenerational rank 
correlations in income. These findings derive from the fact that wealth is more 
representative of cumulate resources and less affected by transitory shocks than 
earnings or income. Moreover, wealthy parents seem to transmit many resources to 
their children at the beginning of the adulthood, by making donations. This may 
explain why, unlike intergenerational correlations in income, intergenerational 
correlations in wealth seem to be very high also considering children in their 20’s. 
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The second chapter exploits retrospective socio-economic information about 
both parents to impute parental wealth in order to assess the degree of wealth 
mobility across generations in Italy and highlight some of the mechanisms linking 
parental wealth to offspring’s economic outcomes.  
Using the Bank of Italy’s survey on household income and wealth (SHIW) and 
two samples of offspring and pseudo-parents in their 40s, I find an intergenerational 
age-adjusted wealth elasticity (IWE) of 0.451 and a rank-rank slope of 0.349 which 
appear to be robust to the use of different predictors of parental economic status. 
These results suggest that Italy is a low mobility country also when wealth is taken 
as an alternative measure of economic status. 
As in the only previous study by Boserup et al. (2016) which analyses the pattern 
of wealth mobility over the lifecycle, the second chapter shows a U-shaped pattern 
of the intergenerational wealth correlation as a function of the second generation’s 
age with higher estimated intergenerational correlations when children are taken at 
the beginning of their adulthood or in their 40’s.  
Geographical differences in the extent of intergenerational wealth mobility are 
analysed by estimating elasticities and rank-rank slopes in two different macro-
areas of the country. Results suggest that the southern part of Italy is extremely less 
mobile than the northern part of the country.  
Regarding the analysis of the mechanisms behind the intergenerational wealth 
correlation across two generations, the second chapter suggests that income seems 
to be the main intergenerational mediating factor. On the contrary, the correlation 
across generations of saving preferences and attitude to risk seems to explain only 
a small fraction of the IWE. 
Finally, the third chapter (which is part of a research work with Michele Raitano 
and Teresa Barbieri) provides new and detailed estimates of intergenerational 
earnings mobility in Italy and sheds light on mechanisms behind the association of 
gross earnings between fathers and sons.  
Being not available panel data following subsequent generations in Italy, we 
make use of a recently built dataset that merges information provided by IT-SILC 
2005 (i.e., the Italian component of EU-SILC 2005) with detailed information about 
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the whole working life of those interviewed in IT-SILC recorded in the 
administrative archives managed by the Italian national Social Security Institute 
(INPS).  
This dataset allows us to rely on the two-sample two-stage least squares method 
(TSTSLS) to predict father earnings and, then, compute point in time 
intergenerational elasticities (IGE) and imputed rank-rank slopes. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the dataset allow us to extend point in time estimates considering, 
for both sons and “pseudo-fathers”, average earnings in a 5-year period and 
observing sons at various ages, thus assessing the robustness of our estimates to 
attenuation and life cycle biases.  
Confirming previous evidence (Mocetti 2007; Piraino 2007), we find that Italy 
is characterized by a relatively high earnings elasticity in cross country comparison 
– the size of the estimated β is usually over 0.40 – and the size of the 
intergenerational association increases when older sons and multi-annual averages 
are considered.  
We then investigate mechanisms behind this association both: i) including a set 
of possible mediating factors of the parental influence (e.g., sons’ education, 
occupation, labour market experience) among the control variables when regressing 
sons’ earnings on fathers’ earnings and ii) following the sequential decomposition 
approach suggested by Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007). Results show that a 
limited share of the intergenerational association is attributable to sons’ educational 
and occupational attainment, while the largest part of the association is mediated 
by sons’ employability, i.e., by their effective experience since the entry in the 
labour market. 
 Results show that the mediating role of education in Italy is limited, especially 
if compared with evidence obtained for other countries such as the US and UK. 
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 Chapter 1: Wealth Inequality and Persistence Across 
Generations: Evidence and Measurement Issues 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews research on wealth inequality and persistence across two 
or more generations. Broadly speaking, wealth is more unequally distributed than 
income and unlike other flow variables, may be transmitted across generations 
directly, by means of bequests or donations. This means that it may be a good proxy 
of permanent economic disparities. Unfortunately, measuring wealth is not an easy 
task since data on real and financial assets are incomplete and provided with many 
differences across countries.  
Regarding the extent of the intergenerational wealth correlation, only a limited 
number of studies are able to use suitable data on wealth which cover two or more 
generations. This is the reason why empirical research still focuses on income to 
measure intergenerational economic mobility. Moreover, most of empirical studies 
on intergenerational wealth are forced to selected two generations at different ages 
because of data limitations. Further evidence is thus needed to credibly compare 
intergenerational correlations in income to intergenerational correlations in wealth.  
In any case, according to few recent empirical works, rank correlations in wealth 
seem to be usually higher than rank correlations in income. These findings derive 
from the fact that wealth is more representative of cumulate resources and less 
affected by transitory shocks than earnings or income. Moreover, wealthy parents 
seem to transmit many resources to their children at the beginning of the adulthood 
by making donations. This may explain why, unlike intergenerational correlations 
in income, intergenerational correlations in wealth seem to be very high also when 
earnings of children are measured at early stages of their careers. 
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Introduction   
The leading character in the studies on economic inequality and mobility across 
generations is usually income, widely considered as the best measure of the degree 
of economic well-being and consumption capacity. Wealth, however, is a key 
indicator of economic status and opportunities since it is able to capture, more than 
income, differences in permanent, rather than current, economic flows of 
individuals and households. Moreover, unlike income, wealth can be directly 
transmitted from one generation to the next by means of bequests and inter-vivos 
transfers, which are likely to increase the intergenerational component of 
inequality.  
Therefore, in the last few years, both the academic and non-academic debate has 
been focusing on how wealth is distributed across individuals.  For instance, 
extreme concentration of wealth at the top is investigated by Piketty (2014) in his 
famous: “Capital in the 21st Century” which has brought again attention to 
economic disparities and wealth accumulation. Other alarming aspects regarding 
the degree of inequality that characterise modern economies, have been presented 
in a recent report by Oxfam which shows that the top 1% of the world population 
owns a greater amount of wealth than the remaining 99% (Hardoon et al., 2016). 
On the contrary, there is only a limited number of recent studies which estimate the 
degree of wealth correlation across two or more generations. This is mainly due to 
the lack of suitable data on wealth which cover different generations.  
The main aim of this chapter is to summarise issues related to the measurement 
of wealth, its distribution and how it is correlated across generations. Since 
economic inequality and its persistence across generations is often measured by 
attempting to capture disparities in lifetime economic resources, it may be useful to 
introduce wealth as a better proxy of permanent economic status.  
However, measuring wealth is not trivial because of the limited availability of 
good quality data on assets and liabilities. Ideally, when measuring net wealth, one 
should include all potentially marketable and non-marketable assets and all 
financial liabilities. Unfortunately, complete information on some specific assets 
such as valuables or pension wealth is not available in most countries.  This is the 
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reason why income is usually preferred over wealth to measure economic inequality 
and its persistence across generations.  
Nevertheless, economic resources may be associated across two or more 
generations either indirectly because of intergenerational correlations in rewarded 
abilities, educational attainments and preferences or directly by means of 
inheritance or donations. Therefore, when estimates of economic mobility are 
provided by measuring both intergenerational correlations in wealth and income, 
the former seems to better capture correlations in overall lifetime resources than the 
latter. This may suggest that intergenerational mobility in lifetime resources may 
be overestimated when income is used as a proxy of permanent status and suitable 
data that cover two generations over their lifecycle are not available.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes concepts and all 
measurement issues that may arise when measuring wealth. Section 1.2 presents 
international comparisons of wealth levels and inequality. Section 1.3 summarizes 
evidence and methodological aspects of empirical studies on intergenerational 
income mobility. Section 1.4 analyses methodological aspects regarding the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.1. Wealth inequality: concepts and measurement issues  
The relatively little attention dedicated to the study of the distribution of net 
wealth, computed as the sum of real and financial assets (gross wealth) minus 
financial liabilities, compared to the study of the distribution of income, is mainly 
due to the limited availability of good quality data about the value of assets and 
debts.  
There are several reasons why the measurement of net wealth is more insidious 
than that of income.  Ideally gross wealth should include all potentially marketable 
and non-marketable assets but information on all sources of wealth is not available 
in all countries. For instance, old-age and occupational pensions or durables other 
than vehicles are not included in the computation of gross wealth since data on non-
marketable assets are often unavailable. To get an idea of how the inclusion or not 
of pensions can change international rankings, think of what should be the amount 
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of private savings accumulated by individuals working in countries without 
extensive social security systems. On the contrary, in the presence of generous 
social security systems, the accumulation of private wealth for old age is less 
important for most individuals but the wealthy. Therefore, this kind of institutional 
differences may affect motivations to accumulate wealth and thus its distribution. 
The inclusion of pension wealth would decrease inequality indices, especially in 
countries characterised by public pensions systems, usually more redistributive. For 
instance, including pension wealth in the computation of net wealth would decrease 
the Gini index from 0.65 to 0.48 in the United Kingdom in 1993 (Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000). However, the redistributive effect of pensions observed in some 
countries has decreased in the last decades because of the shift from public defined-
benefit schemes to public defined-contribution schemes (pensions depend exactly 
on the amount of contributions paid during lifetime). The result of this shift has not 
been neutral in terms of net wealth inequality measured without excluding pension 
wealth (Wolff, 2014). 
In most cases, the level of wealth inequality is not a precise indicator of material 
well-being inequality of individuals or households. Public and welfare policies 
may, in fact, significantly increase the welfare of the poorest, providing public 
transfers which reduce the incentive to save and, thus, to accumulate wealth (also 
in order to purchase real estate properties). For instance, the high degree of wealth 
inequality in Sweden, which is usually presented as one of the most egalitarian 
countries in terms of income distribution, might be surprising. The main reason of 
this apparent contradiction is that a large portion of Swedish own very low or 
negative levels of net wealth (Davies, 2009). This result, which could also reflect 
some measurement errors, is mainly due to the high share of indebted households 
and the low percentage of people living in own house. These two aspects are 
strongly influenced by strong housing policies, which facilitate the access to 
mortgages, and by the generous Swedish public pension system. Similarly, the 
relatively limited wealth inequality observed in Italy is in large part explained by 
the widespread possession of real estate due to poor public housing policies. 
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Another aspect that should not be neglected when making international 
comparisons is the choice of the unit of analysis, which may be the household 
intended as a group of people who live together regardless of kinship relations, the 
family understood as a group of relatives that live together, or the individual. Unlike 
empirical analysis on income inequality, where great importance is given to 
families or households, studies on wealth should be focused on individuals since 
the right to ownership is basically an individual right. Unfortunately, even though 
fiscal data are on an individual basis, most data about net wealth in the surveys take 
the household or the family as unit of analysis.  
Usually, empirical studies that focus on household income inequality make use 
of equivalence scales such as the square-root scale, which divides household 
income by the square root of household size, or the modified OECD scale, which 
assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member 
and of 0.3 to each member under 14 years old. The application of such scales is 
essential to compare households of different size and to consider economies of 
scales in consumption.  
On the contrary, the application of equivalence scales to household wealth is 
more controversial (Sierminska and Smeeding, 2005; Bover, 2010; Jäntti et al., 
2013; Cowell & Kerm, 2015).  In fact, the relationship between household net 
wealth and consumption may be interpreted in several ways. Net wealth may be 
intended as the value of potential future consumption (for instance after retirement). 
In such a case, it is not the current household composition and the household size 
that should matter, but the future composition. On the contrary, if net household 
wealth is interpreted as the ability to finance current consumption, it is better to use 
equivalence scales as in the case of income. If, instead, net wealth is taken as 
measure of socio-economic status or power, there is no reason to apply equivalence 
scales to net wealth.  
Finally, data extracted from sample surveys suffer from numerous measurement 
errors. They are mainly due to sampling and to the shape of the distribution of 
wealth which is very asymmetric with an extreme degree of inequality in the upper 
tail.  This is the reason why data from surveys may lead to an underestimation of 
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the degree of overall net wealth inequality (Vermeulen, 2014). This issue can be 
minimized by over-sampling, using sophisticated techniques, the richest portion of 
the population.  
Another category of measurement errors from sampling is related to the missing 
response from the wealthy. For instance, as reported by the Luxembourg Wealth 
Study (LWS), in Italy the overall response rate was 53% in 2010.  
1.2. Cross-country rankings of wealth levels and inequality 
1.2.1. Wealth levels and distribution 
Because of all measurement issues described in previous section, it is more 
difficult to compare statistics on the degree of wealth inequality than on income 
inequality.  Nevertheless, despite many limitations in the availability of good data 
about wealth, in the last few years empirical research has made a great effort to 
obtain an international ranking of the degree of wealth inequality. For instance, the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), established in 2004, represents a first attempt 
to provide harmonized data on wealth and enable international comparisons 
(Sierminska et al.2006).  
Another source of data on wealth is the OECD Wealth Distribution Database, 
that provides information, for 18 different countries, harmonised according to 
different guidelines (Murtin & d’Ercole, 2015). However, the harmonization 
process is still not perfect and some cross-countries differences remain. For 
instance, there are many cross-country differences in the number of years for which 
data are available or in the degree of wealthy households over-sampling. Therefore, 
unlike international rankings on income distribution which are unanimous in 
considering the Northern European countries as the most egalitarian and the 
English-speaking and southern European countries as those with the highest level 
of inequality, the literature on the distribution of wealth has not achieved the same 
degree of consensus so far (Jäntti et al., 2008). 
In any case, when countries are ranked in terms of net wealth levels, it is 
preferable to use median instead of mean wealth since the latter is likely to be 
strongly influenced by the high degree of wealth concentration in the upper tail of 
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the distribution. For instance, using the latest OECD data on net wealth expressed 
in purchasing power parity U.S. dollars (Figure 1.1 and 1.2), the United States, 
among 16 OECD countries considered, ranks 2th, when countries are classified in 
terms of mean wealth, and 15th when the ranking is based on median net wealth; 
Netherlands and Austria drop respectively from the 14th to the last place and from 
the 9th to the 13th place; Italy ranks 8th using mean wealth and 5th using median 
wealth; Luxembourg leads the ranking choosing either mean or median wealth as a 
measure of net wealth levels. Regarding Northern European countries, previous 
studies report low levels of net wealth in Sweden and Denmark (OECD 2015, 
Cowell et al, 2013).  
Figure 1.1: International ranking by levels of mean wealth  
 
 Source: OECD (Wealth distribution database) Year: 2010 or latest data available. 
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As stated in the previous section, most of these cross-country differences and 
lower levels of net wealth in Scandinavian countries are probably due to 
institutional characteristics. In particular, the presence of universalistic welfare 
systems reduces the need to accumulate economic resources against unexpected 
events, such as increased uncertainty over future earnings or unexpected expenses 
(e.g. health problems or other emergencies).  
   Figure 1.2 International ranking by levels of median wealth 
 
        Source: OECD (Wealth distribution database) Year: 2010 or latest data available 
 Concerning cross-country differences in terms of wealth inequality, it is 
possible to take the Gini index as a typical summary measure of concentration. 
Table 1.1 shows Gini indexes for 16 OECD countries in 2014, using data from 
different sources presented in the Allianz Global Wealth Report 2015.  These data 
report the United States to be a highly unequal country (the value of the Gini index 
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is greater than 0.8), followed by Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria and Germany 
that report a Gini index respectively of 0.799, 0.757, 0.736 and 0.733. Conversely 
net wealth inequality in Greece, Spain, Norway, Australia, Belgium and Italy is the 
lowest among the OECD countries considered, with a Gini index lower than 0.6.  
Table 1.1 Cross-country differences in wealth and income inequality 
Country Gini Wealth Gini Market Income Gini Disposable Income 
Australia 0.573 0.434 0.327 
Austria 0.736 0.426 0.281 
Belgium 0.587 0.425 0.266 
Canada 0.640 0.411 0.325 
Finland 0.645 0.424 0.262 
France 0.655 0.445 0.294 
Germany 0.733 0.419 0.299 
Greece 0.554 0.512 0.353 
Italy 0.592 0.445 0.329 
Netherlands 0.640 0.406 0.287 
Norway 0.568 0.377 0.262 
Portugal 0.634 0.496 0.345 
Spain 0.563 0.479 0.352 
Sweden 0.799 0.383 0.281 
U.K. 0.757 0.471 0.353 
U.S. 0.806 0.473 0.389 
Data sources: Oecd (Database on income distribution and poverty). Allianz Wealth Report 2015 (Wealth)  
The extent of economic inequality measured through the Gini of net wealth is 
usually greater than economic inequality measured by means of the Gini of income. 
For instance, the Gini index of wealth in the US is nearly twice the size of the Gini 
index of market income and more than twice the size of the Gini index of disposable 
income. Even though these two differences are less marked in other countries such 
as Greece or Italy, economic disparities measured in terms of real and financial 
assets holding are generally higher than economic disparities in the labour market. 
This is because economic differences in income and economic disparities in wealth 
are correlated but this correlation is imperfect. In particular, while economic 
disparities in terms of income reflect yearly economic differences, wealth 
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differences are related to cumulate economic performances of individuals and to 
disparities in saving propensity, attitudes to risk and intergenerational transfers.  
1.2.2. Wealth inequality over the distribution  
International rankings may be controversial not only when comparing levels of 
wealth, but also when the main goal is to build credible international rankings which 
make use of the Gini index as a measure of wealth inequality. More specifically, 
the Gini index does not appear to be the most suitable indicator when considering 
variables that can assume negative values. In these cases, in fact, the Gini index 
may also assume value greater than one (Amiel et al., 1996; Cowell, 2013). 
Moreover, international comparisons based on the Gini index are not suitable to 
assess whether higher levels of inequality depend on a high concentration of wealth 
or a high prevalence of debts.  
For instance, higher levels of inequality in Sweden or Denmark seem to be 
strongly correlated to the high incidence of households with negative net wealth 
(Davies et al, 2009): the latter country is characterised by negative levels of net 
worth for the lowest three deciles of the distribution (Davies et al, 2014). Therefore, 
high levels of wealth inequality in the Northern European countries, as well as the 
high diffusion of loans among young people to finance their university studies, 
could be explained by institutional characteristics which, as already said, reduce the 
incentive to accumulate private wealth. Moreover, it is well known in the empirical 
literature that only a small part of the population holds a large fraction of wealth 
(Davies and Shorrocks,2000). For all these reasons, it is preferable to use alternative 
measures of wealth inequality which focus on the on the amount of net wealth held 
by households at different points of the wealth distribution.  
Table 1.2 shows some possible alternative measures of wealth inequality 
presented in the report “In it together: why less inequality benefit all” (OECD, 
2015). For instance, the mean/median wealth ratio is very high in the United States 
and Netherlands with a value of respectively 7.3 and 5. On the contrary, this ratio 
is reported to be the lowest, among the OECD country considered, in Greece, 
Australia, Italy and Spain (column 1).  
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Table 1.2 shows also the difference (expressed as a share of median wealth) 
between the amount of wealth held by those above the 95th percentile (the top 5%) 
and the median wealth (column 2). This ratio, which is useful to evaluate the degree 
of wealth concentration at the top of the distribution, is reported to be about 70 
points higher than the OECD average in the Unites States; Netherlands, Austria and 
Germany are also reported to be highly unequal considering the upper tail of the 
wealth distribution.   
 Table 1.2 Alternative measures of wealth inequality 
Country Mean/Median (Top 5% – Median)/Median (Median – Lowest Quintile)/Median 
Australia 1.6 9.5 1.0 
Austria 3.6 34.7 1.1 
Belgium 1.7 10.1 1.0 
Canada 2.2 15.1 1.0 
Finland 1.9 10.6 1.1 
France 2.0 14.8 1.0 
Germany 3.6 33.8 1.1 
Greece 1.4 6.4 1.0 
Italy 1.6 9.3 1.0 
Luxembourg 1.8 13.8 1.0 
Netherlands 5.0 43.9 1.8 
Norway 1.9 12.7 1.5 
Portugal 2.0 15.9 1.0 
Spain 1.6 9.0 0.9 
U.K. 1.8 11.1 1.0 
U.S. 7.3 90.7 1.3 
OECD18 2.5 20.4 1.1 
   Data source: OECD (2015). Year 2010 or latest available 
Lastly, the third column of table 1.2 focuses on the lower tail of the distribution 
showing differences (expressed again as a share of median wealth) between median 
wealth and the lowest quintile of the wealth distribution. According to this ratio, 
Norway and Netherlands, among the 16 countries considered, are characterised by 
the highest level of wealth inequality in the lower tail of the distribution. Consider 
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however, that cross-country differences in bottom-end wealth inequality are not so 
high. This means that high levels of inequality are mainly due to the higher 
concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution. On the contrary, 
concentration of net wealth in the lower tail, where most of the households have no 
or very limited wealth, is likely to affect only partially overall inequality. 
An important role in explaining differences in the degree of wealth inequality is 
played by financial assets which are mainly concentrated in the upper tail of the 
wealth distribution (OECD 2015). In this respect, Figure 1.3 reports cross-country 
differences in financial and real assets as a share of total gross wealth. The 
percentage of financial assets is very high in the United Stated where most of gross 
wealth is financial wealth. On the contrary, in all other countries considered the 
share of financial assets on gross wealth is lower than or equal to 40%. This 
percentage reaches its lowest values in Australia, Spain, Greece, Luxembourg.  
 Figure 1.3: Share of real and financial assets in gross wealth 
 
Data source: OECD wealth distribution database. Year 2010 or latest available 
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1.3. Intergenerational transmission of economic advantage in the empirical 
literature 
Income has been usually preferred over wealth by researchers, not only to 
measure current economic inequality, but also to evaluate to what extent economic 
inequality is persistent across generations. This is because data of wealth which 
cover two or more generations are rarely available. Moreover, income or earnings 
are usually the beast measure to consider if one wants to evaluate economic 
opportunities in the labour market as a function of parental economic background.   
Intergenerational mobility has been usually defined as the “degree of fluidity” 
between the socio-economic status of parents and that of their children as adults 
(Blanden et al., 2007). Economists, have measured mobility across generations in 
terms of either income or earnings, although the intergenerational transmission 
related to other socio-economic outcomes (e.g. education, occupation) has also 
received great attention. Regardless of the measure of mobility in socio-economic 
status across generations, a strong association between parental and offspring’s 
outcomes entails a low degree of intergenerational mobility, which is arguably 
indicative of the fact that economic opportunities are not equally distributed 
between the individuals of a given society.  
According to the classical “human capital view” based on two seminal works by 
Becker and Tomes (1979 and 1986), the intergenerational inequality transmission 
is mainly due to the role played by liquidity constraints: if capital markets are not 
perfect, investment in human capital of individuals coming from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are limited by the lack of economic resources. However, there could 
be other channels that may explain why individuals coming from better 
backgrounds are likely to get higher wages once in the labour market. For instance, 
economic power of parents may be easily exploited to help children finding the 
right job in terms of current and expected future income.  
In any case, economic well-being is often correlated across generations not only 
because of the indirect association in economic opportunities in the labour market. 
Economic resources are also transmitted directly by means of donations and 
bequests which are not captured by evaluating permanent income flows. This is the 
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reason why it is not simple to obtain measures of mobility able to summarise the 
degree of intergenerational correlation in permanent economic resources.  
1.3.1. The intergenerational earnings or income elasticity: approaches and 
measurement issues 
Empirically, many studies over the last 15/20 years try to evaluate to what extent 
economic advantages are transmitted from one generation to another (see Black & 
Devereux, 2010). The usual way to summarize the degree of intergenerational 
economic correlation is to use earnings or income as a measure of economic welfare 
of individuals and to estimate the following equation:    
 
 𝑦𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑦𝑖
𝑓
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖
𝑠 and  𝑦𝑖
𝑓
 are respectively the logarithm of permanent sons’ and fathers’ 
earnings and 𝛽 is the intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE)1. According to this 
measure of economic association between generations, a country is completely 
mobile when the estimated 𝛽 equals 0 and the higher the earnings elasticity is, the 
lower the degree of economic mobility across generations will be.  
The empirical framework subsumed by equation 1 might appear relatively 
simple at a first sight. However, several methodological issues arise when trying to 
estimate the 𝛽 by means of OLS. For instance, deriving accurate estimates of the 
IGE has proved to be remarkably challenging since permanent incomes are 
generally unobservable.  Usually, data limitations allow researchers to track 
individual income records only for a single or a few years. This source of bias has 
been reduced with by the increasing resort to large administrative dataset. Yet, 
richer data alone are not sufficient to overcome the challenges related to the 
measurement of permanent income. 
Earlier studies on the intergenerational earnings mobility in the U.S. reported 
IGE coefficients around 0.2 (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Behrman and Taubman, 
                                               
1 For a review of the studies on intergenerational earnings mobility, see also Solon (1999), Corak 
(2006) and Blanden (2013). 
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1986; Sewell and Hauser, 1975), leading to the conclusion that the American 
society was characterized by a high degree of mobility across generations. 
However, shortly after, subsequent works demonstrated that those estimates 
were substantially downward biased because of measurement errors in fathers’ 
permanent earnings. Specifically, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) were the 
first ones to point out that the reliance on single-year measures of parental earnings 
and the use of homogenous sample, which generally present less income variation, 
would result in the underestimation of the IGE.  
More formally, if permanent incomes of the first generation are measured with 
error, equation 1 becomes: 
 
 𝑦𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗
+ 𝜗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                 (2) 
 
where  𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗
 is the unobservable permanent income of the first generations and 𝜗𝑖 is 
the measurement error that is assumed to be uncorrelated to  𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗
. Hence, if 
 𝑦𝑖
𝑓
=   𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗
+ 𝜗𝑖, it is possible to compare the consistency of elasticities obtained 
by using permanent incomes of the first generation to that obtained by using yearly 
incomes: 
 
 
?̂?∗
𝑝
→  
𝐶𝑜𝑣( 𝑦𝑖
𝑠, 𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗
)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦
𝑖
𝑓∗
)
> ?̂?  
𝑝
→  
𝐶𝑜𝑣( 𝑦𝑖
𝑠, 𝑦𝑖
𝑓
)
𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑦
𝑖
𝑓∗
)+𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜗𝑖)
                               (3)  
   
 
where ?̂?∗ is the estimator obtained by using true lifetime incomes of fathers and ?̂? 
is the estimator obtained by using incomes affected by transitory shocks so that, by 
construction, 𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗) <  𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑦𝑖
𝑓∗) +  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜗𝑖). 
As it is commonly assumed in the empirical literature, it is possible to reduce 
attenuation biases by averaging the regressor over time if the error component 𝜗𝑖 
has zero-mean.  Accordingly, studies based on larger and more representative 
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datasets that use fathers’ earnings averaged over more than one year (usually four 
or five) yielded estimates around 0.4.  
However, Mazumder (2005a) points out that even using 5-years averaged 
incomes may lead to an underestimation of the IGE since transitory shocks are 
usually very important and persistent. For this reason, he evaluates the pattern of 
mobility as a function of the number of years fathers’ earnings are averaged. Figure 
1.4 shows that the estimated elasticities in the US is likely to be about 30 percent 
higher when fathers’ earnings are averaged over 16 years than when they are 
averaged considering only 5 years. This means that permanent transitory shocks are 
likely to strongly affect estimates of the intergenerational economic mobility if 
permanent measures of economic status are not available.   
Figure 1.4: IGE as a function of the number of years fathers’ earnings are averaged 
 
          Source: Mazumder (2005a) 
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Another important source of bias is related to the selection of sons by age. More 
specifically, since measures of permanent income are not available, researchers 
must decide the optimal age at which earnings of the second generation should be 
measured in order to obtain estimates which are representative of correlations in 
lifetime resources. This is because estimated elasticities are usually affected by both 
left-hand side and right-hand side measurement errors as earnings-age profiles are 
steeper for adult children with higher expected permanent incomes.  
According to an empirical study by Haider and Solon (2006) this lifecycle bias 
can be substantially reduced by choosing both generations around 40 years old. 
Their result has been confirmed by several subsequent empirical studies.  For 
instance, Nybon & Stuhler (2016) find that different measures of intergenerational 
associations in earnings are more consistent if obtained by selecting both 
generations around midlife.   
1.3.2. Lack of data which cover two generations: the two-sample two-stage least 
squares method 
Direct information about fathers’ earnings and/or income is usually limited in 
most of developed and less developed countries. For this reason, it would have been 
extremely hard to make comparisons in terms of economic mobility by considering 
only those countries for which an OLS estimates of intergenerational mobility is 
available.  
A way to overcome this issue was first proposed by Björklund and Jӓntti (1997) 
that make use of the two-sample instrumental variable methodology (TSIV), 
originally described by Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Arellano and Meghir 
(1992), to estimate intergenerational elasticities in Sweden and the United States. 
This approach uses two independent samples and some information about some 
socio-economic characteristics of fathers reported by their sons to predict earnings 
of the older generation. As time goes by, the two-sample two-stage least squares 
approach (TSTSLS) becomes gradually more used because computationally more 
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convenient and asymptotically more efficient than the TSIV (Inoue and Solon, 
2010) 2.  
The TSTSLS estimator is obtained by using a sample of adult sons, who report 
some socio-economic characteristics of their actual fathers, and an independent 
sample of pseudo-fathers, in a two-stage approach. In the first stage the sample of 
pseudo-fathers is exploited by regressing the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
= 𝛼 + 𝜃1 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑓
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                                                  (4) 
      
where  𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
  are earnings of pseudo-fathers, 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑓
 is a vector of their socio-economic 
characteristics, 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  is the usual disturbance. The estimated 
coefficient  𝜃1 is then used to predict missing fathers’ earnings by merging the two 
samples according to child-reported characteristics of actual fathers. The 
intergenerational earnings (or income) elasticity β is thus estimated in the second 
stage: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̂?𝑖
𝐹 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                 (5) 
 
where  𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  is the logarithm of son’s earnings and ?̂?𝑖
𝐹 = 𝜃1 𝑍𝑖
𝐹 is the prediction of 
the logarithm of fathers’ earnings.   
According to an empirical regularity (the mincer equation), the socio-economic 
characteristics which are usually taken to predict fathers’ economic status are either 
fathers’ education, occupational status, sector of activity, area of residence or a 
subset of these predictors3. The more these socio-economic characteristics perform 
well at predicting fathers’ economic status, the less estimated elasticities will be 
                                               
2  For instance, this approach has been used to estimate intergenerational elasticities in many 
countries. See for instance estimates for Sweden and U.S. (Björklund and Jantti, 1997), France 
(Lefranc and Trannoy, 2005), Brazil (Ferreira and Veloso, 2006; Dunn 2007), Australia (Leigh, 
2007a), Italy (Piraino, 2007; Mocetti, 2007), U.K. (Nicoletti and Ermish, 2007) and Spain (Cervini-
Plà, 2015).    
3 See Jerrim et al. (2016) for a review of studies on intergenerational income mobility which use 
the TSTSLS approach. 
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biased compared to the ones obtained by regressing sons’ earnings on actual 
fathers’ earnings. More specifically, when one tries to impute fathers’ economic 
status, he is likely to make some errors in measuring their income. This reduces 
estimated elasticities under the assumption of classical measurement error. 
Moreover, if the set of socio-economic characteristics is not able to capture other 
characteristics of individuals (soft skills, social networks, cultural factors, cognitive 
and non-cognitive abilities), which are positively correlated across generations, 
then the elasticity will be again downward biased. At the same time, since the 
elasticity converges in probability to the covariance between the income of the two 
generations over the variance of the income of the first, if the fraction of the 
variance predicted from the set of socio-economic characteristics exploited in the 
first stage is less than one, then the estimated elasticity may be also upward biased4.  
Even though the final effect of all potential sources of bias is not clear a-priori, 
TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility are usually considered as an upper bound 
on the true intergenerational association (Blanden, 2013). Nevertheless, the higher 
the R2 of the first stage regression is (i.e. the fraction of earnings of the first 
generation predicted from the set of available socio-economic characteristics), the 
lower the amount of all these biases is likely to be5.  
The consistency of the two-sample estimator relies on two additional points. 
Firstly, auxiliary variables used in the first stage should have the same distribution 
in both the sample of pseudo-parents and the sample of offspring even though the 
TSTSLS approach automatically corrects for differences (Inoue and Solon 2010)6. 
Secondly, if auxiliary variables used in the first stage have a positive influence 
on offspring’s income only via parental income and not directly, then the estimated 
elasticity will approximate the causal effect of fathers’ income on sons’ income. 
This means that all previously described sources of bias would disappear in the case 
of exogenous instruments. Nonetheless, studies on mobility across generations are 
                                               
4 See Olivetti and Paserman (2015) for a more formal description of all potential sources of bias 
related to the imputation of the income of the first generation. 
5 As the fraction of the variance explained from the set of predictors in the first stage increases, 
the amount of measurement error becomes lower. Moreover, the upward bias due to the 
underestimation of the variance of the first generation automatically decreases.  
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not usually intended to estimate the causal effect of parental background on 
offspring’s economic outcomes. For this reason, first stage auxiliary variables 
should not be considered as exogenous since they are likely to have a direct 
influence on the outcome variable in the second stage regression. 
1.3.3. Cross-country comparison in the intergenerational earnings elasticity 
Because of all measurement issues that may arise when one tries to estimate the 
IGE, a large empirical effort has been made in the last two decades to improve the 
consistency of estimates. Most of the empirical evidence is provided by using either 
the OLS estimator or the TSTSLS method and by considering two generations 
around 40 years old to minimise the amount of lifecycle bias. In any case, the 
attenuation bias due to measurement errors in the right-hand side of equation 1 is 
only partially mitigated by averaging fathers’ earnings over a 4/5 years period. 
Table 1.3 summarizes estimated earnings elasticities from different empirical 
studies on 12 developed countries which use either the OLS or the TSTSLS 
estimator to measure intergenerational mobility.   
  Table 1.3: Intergenerational earnings elasticity: cross-country comparison 
Country Source Empirical approach IGE 
US Various (Averaged) OLS 0.52 
Italy Piraino (2007) TSTSLS 0.44 
Spain Cervini-Plà (2015) TSTSLS 0.42 
France Lefranc & Trannoy (2005) TSTSLS 0.40 
UK Ermish & Nicoletti (2007) TSTSLS 0.29 
Australia Leigh (2007) TSTSLS 0.25 
Germany Vogel (2006) OLS 0.24 
Sweden Björklund & Chadwick (2003) OLS 0.24 
Canada Corak & Heisz (1999) OLS 0.23 
Finland Pekkarinen et al. (2009) OLS 0.23-30 
Denmark Hussain et al. (2008) OLS 0.14 
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According to this measure of intergenerational association in economic 
opportunities in the labour market, the Unites States is reported to be the less mobile 
society with an estimated 𝛽 of respectively 0.52. This means that a 10 percent 
variation in fathers’ earnings is associated with a 5.2 percent in sons’. Conversely, 
the North countries are reported to be the most mobile, reporting estimated IGE 
ranging from 0.14 to 0.24. The extent of earnings mobility in other developed 
countries such as Germany, Australia and UK is not so far from that reported in 
Scandinavian countries. Lastly, France Spain and Italy resulted to be low mobility 
societies with estimated elasticities around 0.40.  
1.4. Intergenerational wealth mobility across two or more generations 
Estimates of economic mobility across generations are usually intended to 
capture correlations in lifetime resources. As described in previous sections, 
estimates which use earnings or income as a measure of economic status are likely 
to be downward biased because of both left-hand side and right-hand side 
measurement errors. Moreover, correlations in income do not consider all possible 
mediating channels related to the transmission of economic status across different 
generations. This is the reason why, it could be better to evaluate intergenerational 
mobility by considering wealth as a measure of permanent economic status of the 
two generations. In particular, at time T the amount of wealth owned by an 
individual may be expressed in the following form:  
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑇) + 𝑌𝑖,𝑇(1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑇) +  𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑇                          (6) 
 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1 is the stock of net wealth held in the previous period, 𝑟𝑖,𝑇 is the rate 
of return on investments,  𝑌𝑖,𝑇 is the amount of disposable income,  (1 − 𝑐𝑐,𝑇) is the 
propensity to save and 𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑇 is the difference between the amount of direct wealth 
transfers received from the previous generation and those given to the next.  
Since current income is affected by transitory shocks it is possible to rewrite 
equation 6 this way: 
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𝑊𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑇) + (𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑇 +  𝜗𝑖,𝑇)(1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑇) +  𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑇             (7) 
 
where  𝑌∗𝑖,𝑇 is the permanent component of disposable income and 𝜗𝑖,𝑇 captures 
transitory shocks. Then, if we assume a rate of return to investment equal to zero 
for the sake of simplicity, it is possible to express 𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1 as the sum of all incomes 
and donations received in the past and on preferences in terms of propensity to save: 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1 = {∑ [(𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜗𝑖,𝑡)(1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 +  ∑ (𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 }              (8) 
 
If, as it is commonly assumed in the empirical literature, transitory shocks of 
income have zero-mean such that for T large enough ∑ 𝜗𝑖,𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1  ≅ 0, it is possible 
to re-write equation 8 in the following form:  
   
          𝑊𝑖,𝑇−1 = ∑ [(𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑡)(1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 +  ∑ (𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇−1
𝑡=1                        (9) 
   
by assuming that yearly wealth is measured when individuals are old enough such 
that they have had enough time to accumulate wealth. Therefore, one period later, 
it is possible to write: 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑇 = ∑ [(𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑡)(1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1
+  ∑ (𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
                  (10) 
 
Equation 10 is very useful to get an idea of why wealth could be preferred over 
income as a measure of permanent economic status of the two generations when 
data which cover parents and children over their entire lifecycle are not available. 
Unlike current income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡, which is affected by transitory shocks, current wealth 
𝑊𝑖,𝑇  automatically incorporates a measure of cumulate economic status which 
depends on the sum of all incomes earned in the past. This means, that estimates of 
intergenerational wealth correlations obtained by regression wealth of children on 
that of parents could be, at least from a theoretical point of view, higher than 
estimates of income correlations which use measures of incomes that are not 
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averaged over many years. However, this is only true if individuals are taken at 
median ages or older such that transitory shocks cannot cause attenuation biases. 
In any case, intergenerational correlations in wealth are likely to be higher than 
correlations in income also because of intergenerational transfers. In particular, the 
mediating role of donations and bequests should be very important at the beginning 
of the adulthood, when parents make inter-vivos transfers, and later during the 
lifecycle because of inheritance. This means that permanent economic resources are 
likely to be better captured at median ages when the difference between transfers 
received from the previous generation and transfers given to the next reaches its 
minimal value and economic resources are representative of cumulate earnings 
(Boserup et al. (2016). 
1.4.1. The intergenerational wealth elasticity (IWE) 
Despite all the potential advantages related to the use of wealth as a measure of 
permanent economic resources, only a few empirical recent studies have analysed 
how economic advantage is transmitted across generations by using wealth instead 
of earnings or income as a measure of economic well-being. This is mainly due to 
the already recalled limited availability of good quality data on wealth and to the 
fact that earnings are broadly considered as a good measure of differences in 
consumption capacity and economic welfare. Unlike studies of intergenerational 
income mobility which usually estimate the correlation in earnings or income 
between fathers and sons, studies on wealth mobility estimate the correlation 
between parents and adult children. 
 As in the case of income, the first commonly used way to evaluate the degree 
of intergenerational wealth mobility is to estimate the following equation:    
 
 𝑤𝑖
0 = 𝛼 +  𝛾  𝑤𝑖
𝑃 +  𝑋𝑖
𝑂,𝑃𝜀𝑖                                           (11) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖
0 and  𝑤𝑖
𝑃 are the logarithm of offspring’s and parental wealth,  𝑋𝑖
𝑂,𝑃
is a 
vector which includes age and age squared of both offspring and parents and 𝛾 is 
the intergenerational wealth elasticity. Using this approach, Charles and Hurst 
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(2003), obtain a wealth elasticity of 0.37 for the United States. This means that, in 
the Unites States, a 10 percent increase in parental net wealth seems to be associated 
with a 3.7% increase in offspring’s. Other studies which use the same log 
transformation, find lower elasticities for Sweden (Adermon et al., 2015), Denmark 
(Boserup et al., 2013), France (Arrondel, 2009) and Norway (Fageren et al., 2015). 
These results summarised in table 1.4 seem to confirm that the United States is a 
country with a low degree of intergenerational economic mobility even considering 
wealth instead of earnings as a measure of economic status.   
Table 1.4: Intergenerational wealth association: cross-country comparison  
Country Source Parent’s Age Offspring’s Age 
Estimated 
Elasticity 
(LOG) 
Estimated 
Elasticity 
(IHS) 
Rank Slope 
US 
Charles and Hurst 
(2003) 
52 37.5 0.37 / / 
US 
Pfeffer and 
Killewald 
(2015) 
43.4 44.6 0.41 / 0.37 
Denmark 
Boserup et al. 
(2013) 
48.6 33.9 0.27 0.19 0.23 
Denmark 
Boserup et al. 
(2016) 
47.9 47.2 0.24 0.22 0.27 
Sweden 
Adermon et al. 
(2015) 
57-63 42-49 0.32 / 0.39 
Sweden 
Black et al. 
(2015) 
63.9 43.8 / 0.27 0.35 
Norway 
Fageren et al. 
(2015) 
62.7 36.1 0.2 / 0.18 
France 
Arrondel 
(2009) 
58.9 33.8 0.22 / / 
 
 
Consider however, that most studies are forced to take offspring and parents at 
different ages, because of the lack of data which cover two generations during their 
entire lifecycle. This means that, even though wealth is less affected by lifecycle 
bias than earnings or income, using too young offspring may cause some problems 
if they have had no enough time to accumulate financial and real assets (Charles 
and Hurst, 2003; Conley and Glauber, 2008). Two exceptions are provided by 
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Boserup et al. (2016) that obtained an IWE of 0.27 for Denmark and Pfeffer and 
Killewald (2015) that reported an elasticity of 0.41 for the United States by 
selecting offspring and parents when they are in their 40s. The latter results seems 
to confirm the presence of a downward bias in previous estimated elasticities which 
use too young offspring since the elasticity reported by Pfeffer and Killewald 
(2015) is higher than the one obtained by Charles and Hurst (2003) selecting 
offspring in their 30s and parents in their early 50s 
1.4.2. The hyperbolic inverse sine transformation  
Unlike income, wealth may also assume negative values because of financial 
liabilities. This means that estimated elasticities obtained by using the classical log-
log specification automatically excludes all zero and negative values (i.e. the lower 
tail of the wealth distribution). This may cause a selection bias in estimated 
elasticities if the degree of intergenerational wealth correlation is not stable across 
the wealth distribution (Charles and Hurst, 2003; Killewald, 2013; Hansen, 2014; 
Pfeffer and Killewald 2015, Adermon et al. 2015). This is the reason why an 
alternative available approach has been used to estimate intergenerational wealth 
elasticities on the full sample of households using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation (IHS). This transformation assumes the following form: 
 
𝜃1 sin ℎ−1 (𝜃𝑊) = 𝜃1 ln (𝜃𝑊 + (𝜃2𝑊2 + 1)
1
2⁄ )                   (12) 
 
where W is a measure of wealth and 𝜃 is a scaling parameter. The proportion of the 
IHS transformation which is linear depends on the parameter 𝜃: as the parameter 
gets close to zero, the transformation becomes linear for a larger fraction of its 
domain (Pence 2006). In the case of studies on wealth mobility the parameter is 
usually assumed to be one in order to get a transformation which is very similar to 
the logarithm transformation. Thus, when the parameter is equal to one, the IHS 
transformation becomes:   
 
𝑤 = log (𝑊 + √𝑊2 + 1)                                     (13) 
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This means that the IHS transformation behaves as 𝑙𝑜𝑔|𝑊| everywhere but in the 
neighbourhood of zero when the scaling parameter is equal to one. 
Even though this alternative transformation allows researchers to compute 
estimates of mobility that do not exclude the lower tail of the wealth distribution, 
only a small number of studies try to estimate the IWE by using the IHS 
transformation. For instance, Boserup et al. (2013) report an estimated elasticity for 
Denmark of 0.27 and of 0.19 using respectively the log and IHS transformation. 
Table 1.4 shows that also in the case of Sweden the IHS elasticity reported by Black 
et al. (2015) is lower than the log elasticity reported by Adermon et al. (2015) in a 
study on the same country.  
1.4.3. Rank-Rank slopes 
The most commonly used way to evaluate the degree of intergenerational wealth 
association, without excluding zero or negative values is to estimate rank-rank 
slopes instead of elasticities. Rank-rank slopes may be easily obtained by estimating 
the following equation: 
 
 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑊𝑖
0) = 𝛼 +  𝛿 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑊𝑖
𝑃) + 𝜀𝑖                                   (14) 
 
where offspring’s and parental wealth  𝑊𝑖
0 and 𝑊𝑖
𝑃 are percentile ranked so that 𝛿 
is the percentile variation in offspring’s wealth associated to a 1 percentile variation 
in parental wealth. There are many reasons to prefer rank-rank slopes over 
elasticities. As it is well known in the empirical literature, elasticities capture both 
the re-ranking across generations and the difference in the amount of inequality. On 
the contrary, rank-rank slopes are not sensitive to differences in the marginal 
distribution across groups (Chetty et al., 2014; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014). As a matter 
of fact, it is possible to express the relationship between the elasticity and the rank-
rank slope in the following form: 
 
𝛽 ≅ 𝜌𝑟
𝜎𝑜
𝜎𝑝
                                                    (15) 
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where 𝜌𝑟 if the rank-rank slope and 𝜎𝑜 𝜎𝑝⁄  is the ratio between the standard 
deviations of offspring’s and parental wealth. This means that while the elasticity 
is informative about the rate of regression to the mean of wealth, rank estimators 
are informative about the positional correlation in wealth. Observe that, since they 
are not affected by any change in the earnings dispersion across generations, rank-
rank slopes seem to be less affected by transitory shocks and measurement errors 
and therefore more robust to lifecycle bias and attenuation bias (Gregg et al. 2014; 
Mazumder, 2015). 
Finally, rank-rank measures do not exclude individuals in the lower tail of the 
wealth distribution. This aspect is important if the degree of wealth correlation is 
not stable along the wealth distribution. In particular, the degree of wealth 
association across different generations may be overestimated (underestimated) if 
the intergenerational correlation is lower (higher) in the lower tail than in the rest 
of the wealth distribution. 
According to this different measure of wealth persistence across generations, the 
Unites States is confirmed to be a low mobility country among those for which a 
rank-rank slope estimate is available (table 1.4, last column). In this case, however, 
the difference in the degree of wealth association between the United Stated and 
Sweden appears to be very low. This means that Sweden, which is characterised by 
high levels of wealth inequality due to financial liabilities, is also a country with a 
low degree of mobility across generations when considering wealth instead of 
earnings as a measure of economic status.  
1.4.4. The pattern of wealth mobility over the lifecycle of child 
The framework proposed in section 1.4 describes why wealth should be 
preferred over income to measure correlations in permanent economic status. 
However, that framework is not able to suggest at what point of the lifecycle one 
should measure the intergenerational wealth association in order to capture the 
economic correlation in lifetime resources. As discussed in section 1.3.1, the 
intergenerational income correlation is better captured by selecting both generations 
in their 40s. This is because the income growth rate is usually higher for sons 
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coming from higher income households. This means that the income variance is 
low at early stages of individuals careers and increases later during the lifecycle.  
What about wealth? From a theoretical point of view, life-cycle accumulation 
models predict wealth to be hump shaped over an individual’s lifetime (Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000). There is also some empirical evidence showing that wealth 
accumulation reaches its peak at retirement age, since assets are usually 
accumulated over the working age and decline after retirement age (see OECD, 
2008).  Thus, it is well acknowledged in the literature on wealth mobility that 
choosing too young offspring is likely to influence the consistency of estimated 
measures of intergenerational mobility. (Charles and Hurst, 2003; Conley and 
Glauber, 2008 Pfeffer and Killewald, 2015).  
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the robustness of estimates of 
intergenerational mobility to the lifecycle bias. The only empirical study which 
attempts to assess the pattern of the intergenerational wealth correlation as a 
function of offspring’s age is the one by Boserup et al (2016). Contrary to 
expectations, they find a U-shaped pattern of the intergenerational wealth 
correlation as a function of children’s age, with higher intergenerational 
correlations if offspring are taken when they are very young or from their 40s.  
They explain this pattern trough life-cycle patterns in transfers, earnings and 
consumption. More specifically, wealthy parents are likely to make a larger amount 
of inter-vivos transfers early in children’s life. Subsequently, their children have 
low current income, when investing in education, but higher expected lifetime 
income than other individuals their age. Thus, at this stage of their lifecycle they 
are likely to have a higher propensity to consume than the rest of the population 
(i.e. lower wealth accumulation at early stages of their careers). Then, after their 
parents died, they receive again direct transfers of wealth in the form of bequests. 
According to this simple explanation, the intergenerational wealth correlation 
should be very high considering children at the beginning of their adulthood; low 
at early stages of their careers; high again from their 40s; extremely high after they 
have received direct wealth transfers in the form of bequests.  
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This U-shaped pattern of wealth mobility as a function of children’s age, which 
reflects the mediating role of different intergenerational channels at different points 
of the lifecycle, has been confirmed empirically by Boserup et al. (2016) in a study 
on mobility in Denmark. Using rank-rank measures of wealth mobility they find a 
rank correlation of 0.35 selecting children around 20 years old which decreases to 
0.17 if children are selected around 27 years old. Their estimated rank correlation 
rises to 0.27 when children are taken in their 40s (figure 1.5).  
Figure 1.5: Intergenerational rank correlation in wealth and income over the 
lifecycle of the child in Denmark 
 
   Source: Boserup et al. (2016) 
On the contrary, the pattern of income mobility presented in figure 1.5 is very 
different and in line with previous studies which analyse how the intergenerational 
income correlation evolves over the lifecycle. In particular, the rank correlation in 
income is always lower than the rank correlation in wealth suggesting that using 
38 
 
income as a measure of permanent economic status is likely to overestimate the 
degree of economic mobility across generations. Moreover, unlike wealth, income 
appears to be weakly correlated across generations when children are selected at 
the beginning of their adulthood. Subsequently, the rank correlation in income 
increases to 0.20 when the second generation is selected in their 40s.   
The two patterns described by Boserup et al. (2016) suggest that it is better to 
select offspring around 40 years old even if wealth instead of income is used a 
measure of economic status of the two generations in order to get a proxy of the 
intergenerational correlation in lifetime resources. 
1.4.5. Estimates of wealth and income mobility, are they comparable? 
As described in previous sections, estimates of intergenerational mobility are 
limited by the lack of data which cover two generations for their entire lifecycle. 
This means, that estimates provided in the literature are likely to be only a good 
approximation of correlations in permanent economic status. In any case, 
researchers may choose between estimates of income or wealth mobility depending 
of the main goal of their analysis. For instance, if the main objective of a research 
is to evaluate the transmission from one generation to the next of economic 
opportunities in the labour market or consumption capacities, it is more appropriate 
to keep focusing on income or earnings mobility. On the contrary, if researchers 
want to consider all possible sources of intergenerational correlations and to use a 
measure which is more related to cumulate rather than current economic status of 
individuals it is better to estimate intergenerational correlations by focusing on 
wealth. 
Obviously, the two measures of mobility are correlated because, all things being 
equal, the more income is correlated across generations, the higher the 
intergenerational correlation in the capacity of accumulate assets will be. However, 
if income measures of intergenerational correlations are affected by attenuation and 
lifecycle bias, economic mobility is likely to be overestimated. Moreover, it may 
be important to consider all direct intergenerational transfers which are likely to 
further decrease intergenerational economic mobility. 
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A simple way to evaluate if estimates of wealth mobility are more appropriate to 
capture economic correlations in lifetime resources is to compare estimated 
intergenerational rank correlations in wealth to estimated intergenerational 
correlations in income for all countries for which these two measures of mobility 
are available. Rank correlations are more appropriate than elasticities to make 
comparisons because the latter are influenced by changes in inequality across 
generations. This means that in those countries in which income inequality has 
increased more (less) than wealth inequality, IGE are likely to be automatically 
higher (lower) than IWE.  
Ideally, one would consider rank measures of mobility estimated by selecting 
two generations in their 40s to minimise the amount of lifecycle bias. 
Unfortunately, rank correlations in wealth are often obtained by selecting younger 
offspring so that they are likely to be underestimated. This is the reason why, I 
restrict the comparison to three countries for which estimated rank correlations are 
obtained by selecting offspring aged 40 years old. 
Table 1.5: Intergenerational rank correlations in wealth and income 
Country 
Rank-Rank slope  
(Wealth) 
Rank-Rank Slope  
(Income) 
Sources (Wealth/Income) 
US 0.37 0.31-40 
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015/ 
Mazumder (2015) 
Denmark 0.27 0.20 Boserup et al. (2016) 
Sweden 0.39 0.22 
Adermon et al. (2015)/ 
Bratberg et al. (2017) 
 In all studies considered, rank correlations are estimated by choosing parents and adult children around 40 years old. 
Estimates of rank correlations in income for the US are obtained by averaging income of children over 1 to 15 years. In the 
other countries incomes are averaged over 3 to 5 years. Rank correlations in wealth are obtained by using a single year 
measure in the case of US or 2/3 years in the case of Denmark and Sweden.  
   Table 1.5 summarizes estimated rank correlations in wealth and income for 
countries for which both estimates are available. The two coefficients are obtained 
by considering either income or wealth of both parents as a measure of economic 
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background and without excluding adult daughters from the second generation.  
Estimated rank correlations in wealth appear to be considerably higher than rank 
correlations in income in Sweden and in Denmark. This result may suggest that in 
Scandinavian countries the intergenerational correlation of economic resources is 
only partially captured by rank correlations in income. This means that in Denmark 
and Sweden parents are likely to transmit economic well-being to their children by 
means of inter-vivos transfers made at the beginning of children’s adulthood. 
Alternatively, it may also be the case that estimates of income mobility are more 
affected by attenuation bias if they are not properly averaged over many years.  
To evaluate this aspect, table 1.5 reports also estimated rank correlations in 
income and wealth for the US. Rank correlations in income appear to be 
considerably downward biased if parental and children’s income are not averaged 
considering many years (Mazumder, 2015). In particular, the estimated rank 
correlation is 0.31, if parental income is not averaged, and 0.40 if it is averaged over 
15 years. On the contrary, the estimates rank correlation in wealth is high and equal 
to 0.37 even considering a single-year measure of parental wealth. 
According to evidence reported in table 1.5. it is still not completely clear if 
researchers should choose wealth or income when measuring intergenerational 
economic mobility. Rank correlations in wealth are likely to be higher than rank 
correlations in income when the latter is not properly averaged. In any case, higher 
intergenerational rank correlations in wealth may persist if other intergenerational 
channels related to bequests, donations or preferences are not negligible. However, 
further evidence is needed to obtain a clearer picture of the relationship between 
measures of intergenerational income mobility and estimates of wealth mobility. 
Therefore, estimates of income and wealth mobility for other countries are well 
accepted. 
1.4.6. The multigenerational case 
A further advantage of estimating intergenerational economic mobility by 
considering wealth instead of income is that wealth is likely to be transmitted more 
than income across multiple generations by means of direct multigenerational 
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transfers. This the reason why some of the studies which estimate the degree of 
wealth association between parents and offspring, provide also evidence on 
multigenerational wealth associations7. For instance, using grandparent’s wealth as 
a measure of economic background, Boserup et al. (2013), Pfeffer and Killewald 
(2015) and Adermon et al. (2015) report an estimated rank slope between 0.16 and 
0.19 in their studies on Denmark, Unites States and Sweden (table 1.6). Moreover, 
the association between grandparents’ and offspring’s wealth is lower, but still 
statistically significant, in Denmark and the Unites States when also parental wealth 
is included as a further control (table 1.6, last column).  
Table 1.6: Wealth Association across three generations: cross-country comparison 
Country Source 
Grandparents’ 
age 
Offspring’s 
age 
Rank 
Slope 
Rank Slope 
(including 
also parental 
wealth) 
U.S. 
Pfeffer and 
Killewald 
(2015) 
61.6 37.0 0.19 0.10 
Denmark 
Boserup et al. 
(2013) 
47.1 23.4 0.16 0.12 
Sweden 
Adermon et al. 
(2015) 
48-55 42-49 0.17 
Not 
significant 
 
 
The latter results, while suggesting a strong persistence of wealth across 
generations, seem to confirm the dynastic component of wealth inequality. 
However, as in the two generations case, estimates of wealth mobility should be 
taken carefully since grandparents and offspring are often taken at different points 
of their lifecycle.  
                                               
7 Among all studies of economic mobility across generations, also Clark & Cummins (2014) and 
Barone & Mocetti (2016) provide estimate of multigenerational economic correlations. However, 
they are not included in table 1.6 for reasons of comparability. In particular, both studies consider 
generations that are several centuries apart. Moreover Barone & Mocetti (2016) obtain estimates of 
economic mobility by considering only a single Italian city (Florence). 
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1.5. Concluding Remarks 
Measuring economic disparities by using net wealth rather than income is not an 
easy task. Data on all real and financial assets are rarely available and with many 
differences across countries. For instance, including pension assets or valuables 
other than vehicles in the computation may completely change international 
rankings. Moreover, the harmonization process is still not perfect and some cross-
countries differences remain, starting with the number of years for which data are 
available or with differences in the degree of wealthy households over-sampling, 
used to mitigate the underestimation of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution.  
Despite all measurement issues, at any point of time wealth is likely to capture 
differences in lifetime economic resources better than income because it is less 
affected by transitory shocks, strongly associated to cumulate earnings and directly 
transmitted from one generation to the next by means of donations or bequests. For 
all these characteristics, economic mobility across generations may be better 
measured by using wealth instead of income since suitable data which cover two 
generations over their entire lifecycle are usually not available.  
Unfortunately, only few studies compare intergenerational correlations in 
income to intergenerational correlations in wealth by selecting two generations at 
median ages. Nevertheless, these studies show that economic mobility measured by 
correlations in income is likely to be overestimated if earnings of the two 
generations are not properly averaged over many years. Introducing wealth may, at 
least partially, reduce this kind of underestimation without requiring the use of very 
large panel which cover two generations over their entire lifecycle. However, 
further evidence is needed to confirm these results since estimates of mobility 
which use wealth as a measure of economic status are very recent and hardly 
comparable by country and age of the two generations.  
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 Chapter 2: The Poor Stay Poor, the Rich Get Rich: Wealth 
Mobility Across Two Generations in Italy 
 Abstract 
 
This work uses the two-sample two-stage least square (TSTSLS) method to 
assess the degree of wealth mobility across generations in Italy and highlight some 
of the mechanisms linking parental wealth to offspring’s economic outcomes. 
Parental wealth is imputed by exploiting child-reported socio-economic 
characteristics of both parents since direct information about parental wealth is not 
available for Italy. 
Using the Bank of Italy’s survey on household income and wealth (SHIW) and 
two samples of offspring and pseudo-parents in their 40s, I find an intergenerational 
age-adjusted wealth elasticity (IWE) of 0.451 and a rank-rank slope of 0.349 which 
appear to be robust to the use of different predictors of parental economic status. 
These results suggest that Italy is a low mobility country also when wealth is taken 
as the measure of economic status. 
As in the only previous study by Boserup et al. (2016) which analyses the pattern 
of wealth mobility over the lifecycle, this chapter shows a U-shaped pattern of the 
intergenerational wealth correlation as a function of the second generation’s age 
with higher estimated correlations when children are taken at the beginning of their 
adulthood or in their 40s.  
Geographical differences in the extent of intergenerational wealth mobility are 
analysed by estimating elasticities and rank-rank slopes in two different macro-
areas of the country. Results suggest that the southern part of Italy is extremely less 
mobile than the northern part of the country.  
Regarding the analysis of the mechanisms behind the intergenerational wealth 
correlation across two generations, this chapter suggests that income is the main 
intergenerational mediating factor if individuals are taken in their 40s. On the 
contrary, the correlation across generations of saving preferences and attitude to 
risk seems to explain only a small fraction of the IWE. 
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Introduction 
Wealth, intended as the sum of all financial and real assets minus liabilities, is 
getting increasingly attention in the last few years for several empirical reasons. It 
can be considered as a better proxy of permanent economic resources than other 
more frequently used flow variables since it is strongly influenced by cumulative, 
rather than yearly, net earnings and thus it is less affected by transitory shocks (see 
Chapter 1). Moreover, unlike income or earnings, it may be directly transmitted 
from one generation to another through bequests or inter-vivos transfers. 
The renewed interest on wealth has encouraged many studies on economic 
inequality. For instance, extreme concentration of wealth at the top of the 
distribution and economic inequality related to inheritance has been investigated by 
Piketty (2014) in his famous: “Capital in the 21st Century” which, while becoming 
a bestseller worldwide, has brought again attention on the topic of economic 
disparities and wealth accumulation.  
Unfortunately, only few studies attempt to estimate wealth mobility across 
generations8. This is mainly due to the lack of suitable data on wealth which cover 
two generations during adulthood. Therefore, estimates of the intergenerational 
wealth association are only available for the Unites States (Charles and Hurst, 2003; 
Pfeffer and Killewald, 2015), France (Arrondel, 2008) or Scandinavian countries 
(Boserup et al., 2013; Fageren et al., 2015; Black et al., 2015; Adermon et al., 2015; 
Boserup et al., 2016). These empirical studies, while confirming that United States 
is a less mobile society than Denmark or Norway, highlight some of the 
mechanisms related to the transmission of wealth from one generation to the next.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on wealth mobility in several ways. It 
provides a first estimate of the degree of wealth mobility across two generations in 
Italy which may be representative of the degree of wealth mobility in the Southern-
European countries. Italy is an interesting case study since is characterized by 
higher levels of income inequality and intergenerational income immobility and 
lower levels of wealth inequality than other developed countries (D’Alessio, 2012; 
                                               
8 Two studies estimate the degree of wealth mobility in the very long run in England (Clarks and 
Cummins 2015), and in Florence (Barone e Mocetti, 2016) using rare surnames to track families. 
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Maestri et al, 2014; OECD, 2015). The lower degree of wealth inequality in Italy is 
mainly related to the high share of estate wealth on total net wealth which is usually 
less dispersed than financial wealth.  
To measure intergenerational wealth mobility, I use both intergenerational 
wealth elasticities and rank-rank slopes. The latter is important to obtain proper 
estimates of mobility that do not exclude those with zero and negative wealth. Since 
direct information about parental economic status is not available, I estimate the 
IWE by exploiting the two-sample two-stage least squares method (TSTSLS). This 
approach, which has been already used in the empirical literature to estimate the 
degree of intergenerational earnings or income mobility, uses two independent 
samples and some socio-economic information about actual parents given by 
offspring to impute parental wealth ad obtain estimated intergenerational 
elasticities. The rank-rank slope is obtained by predicting parental wealth and 
imputing parental rank through the usage of information on socio-economic 
characteristics of actual parents given by offspring.  
This chapter evaluates the robustness of estimated IWE and rank-rank slopes to 
the selection of different samples of offspring by age. Most of the evidence on the 
degree of wealth mobility is provided by elasticities computed by taking offspring 
and parents at different ages. This is due to the lack of data which cover two or 
more generations over their life-cycle. However, it is well acknowledged in the 
literature on wealth mobility that choosing too young offspring is likely to influence 
the consistency of estimated elasticities since they have had no enough time to 
accumulate wealth (Charles and Hurst, 2003; Conley and Glauber, 2008 Pfeffer and 
Killewald, 2015). 
Nevertheless, since wealth is related to cumulative economic performances and 
intergenerational transfers that individuals may receive also when they are very 
young, estimates of wealth mobility are likely to be less affected by transitory 
shocks and affected in a different way by the lifecycle bias compared to estimates 
of income or earnings mobility. More specifically, wealthy parents are likely to 
make a larger amount of economic transfers to their children at the beginning of 
their adulthood. Subsequently, at early stages of their careers, children from 
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wealthy households will have lower yearly incomes and propensity to save but 
higher expected permanent incomes and wealth accumulation than other young 
individuals This is the reason why the intergenerational wealth correlation is likely 
to be U-shaped over the lifecycle with lower estimated mobility when children are 
taken at the beginning of their adulthood or in their 40s (see Boserup, 2016). 
The chapter evaluates also geographical differences in intergenerational wealth 
mobility. Since the sample of offspring is not as large as it is needed to obtain 20 
different estimates of wealth mobility by region, I decided to compare 
intergenerational wealth mobility by considering only two different areas of Italy, 
the north/centre and the South/Islands. 
Finally, I decompose the IWE into different factors which may explain why 
wealth is correlated across generations. In particular, there may be a positive 
intergenerational wealth association because of bequests and donations or if 
preferences, which may influence both the rate of return on savings and the 
propensity to save, and permanent income, which affects the amount of lifetime 
savings, are positively correlated across generations. 
Results show an age-adjusted elasticity of 0.451, which is not that far from the 
value of 0.41 obtained by Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) in a study on the United 
States, and higher than estimated elasticities obtained for other countries. The 
estimated rank-rank slope of 0.349 is instead very close to estimates obtained for 
US and Sweden. These two different measures of mobility appear to be robust to 
different socio-economic characteristics used to predict parental wealth and less 
affected by the lifecycle bias if individuals of the second generation are taken when 
they are extremely young or in their 40s. This result seems to confirm previous 
evidence that show a U-shaped pattern of the intergenerational wealth correlation 
as a function of children’s age. 
Intergenerational wealth mobility appears to be extremely lower in the southern 
part of Italy than in the rest of the country with an estimated IWE of 0.621 and a 
rank-rank slope of 0.407. These results suggest a strong incidence of parental 
background on economic well-being for those living in the less developed regions 
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of Italy even though spatial mobility across different areas of the country may 
partially explain estimated differences. 
The division of the intergenerational association into different mediating 
mechanisms shows that permanent labour income of the second generation, among 
other mediating factors such as preferences and bequests or donations, is associated 
with most of the overall wealth elasticity across generations.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the conceptual 
framework behind the intergenerational transmission of wealth and the reasons why 
it may be useful to focus on wealth over income as a measure of parental 
background. Section 2.2 presents the empirical strategy used to estimate the degree 
of wealth mobility. Section 2.3. describes the data and the selection of offspring and 
parents into the final samples. Section 2.4 discusses the results obtained in terms of 
IWE and rank-rank slopes. Section 2.5 discusses the results regarding the mediating 
role of different intergenerational mechanisms. Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.1. Conceptual Framework 
As described in chapter 1, at any point of time 𝑡, the amount of net wealth of the 
generation 1, intended as the sum of all real and financial assets minus financial 
liabilities, can be described by the following expression: 
 
𝑊𝑝,𝑡
1 = 𝑊𝑝,𝑡−1
1 (1 + 𝑟𝑝,𝑡
1 ) + 𝑌𝑝,𝑡
1 (1 − 𝑐𝑝,𝑡
1 ) +  𝑇𝑟𝑝,𝑡
1                          (1) 
 
where 𝑊𝑝,𝑡−1
1  is the amount of net wealth owned by parents 𝑝 at time 𝑡 − 1, 𝑟𝑝,𝑡
1  is 
the rate of return of return on net assets, 𝑌𝑝,𝑡
1  is the amount of disposable income 
earned at time 𝑡, 𝑐𝑝,𝑡
1  is the propensity to consume and 𝑇𝑟𝑝,𝑡
1  is the difference 
between the amount of bequests or donations received from the previous generation 
and those given to the next. Similarly, one generation later, the amount of net wealth 
owned by an adult child 𝑐, at time 𝑡, is given by: 
 
𝑊𝑐,𝑡
2 = 𝑊𝑐,𝑡−1
2 (1 + 𝑟𝑐,𝑡
2 ) + 𝑌𝑐,𝑡
2 (1 − 𝑐𝑐,𝑡
2 ) +  𝑇𝑟𝑐,𝑡
2                          (2) 
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Therefore, in a two generations model, the amount of wealth owned by the first 
generation is positively correlated to that owned by the second for three main 
reasons. There may be a positive intergenerational wealth association as real or 
financial assets are directly transmitted from one generation to the next by means 
of donations or bequests. Moreover, preferences in terms of risk and attitudes 
toward future that influence both the rate of return on financial and real assets and 
the propensity to save, can be correlated across generations. Lastly, as it is well 
known from the literature on intergenerational income mobility, permanent 
disposable income, which affects the amount of lifetime savings, is positively 
correlated across generations through several channels. For instance, parents are 
likely to transmit some cognitive or non-cognitive abilities to their children that can 
be useful in the labour market. Moreover, in the presence of imperfect capital 
markets and liquidity constraint, wealthy parents are able to invest a greater amount 
of resources in their children human capital, boosting their economic outcomes in 
the labour market (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986). Finally, children growing up 
in higher income families may exploit their parents’ social networks and economic 
power to obtain well paid occupation and higher wages than other children9. 
As in the case of income mobility, estimates of wealth mobility may be 
influenced by the age at which wealth of the two generations is measures since the 
importance of each single intergenerational channel may vary over the lifecycle. 
For instance, the component  𝑇𝑟𝑐,𝑡
2  is likely to be very important at the beginning of 
the adulthood, when wealthy parents make inter-vivos transfers to their children, 
and later during the lifecycle when offspring receive direct transfers by means of 
bequests. On the contrary, estimates of wealth mobility may be less affected by 
attenuation bias since wealth measured at time t is likely to be less influenced by 
transitory shocks than current income (see chapter 1). For instance, if current 
incomes of employees are particularly low (high) with respect to his permanent 
income because of an economic crisis (boom) or because they are taken at early 
                                               
9 See, among others, Meade (1973), Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Franzini and Raitano (2009) 
for a detailed description of the channels of influence of parental background on children’s economic 
outcomes. 
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(later) stages of their careers, then using yearly incomes will lead to biased estimates 
of intergenerational mobility.  
In any case, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the robustness of estimates 
of intergenerational wealth mobility to the lifecycle bias. The only empirical study 
which attempts to assess the pattern of intergenerational wealth correlation as a 
function of offspring’s age is that by Boserup et al (2016). They found a U-shaped 
pattern of intergenerational wealth correlation as a function of children’s age, with 
higher intergenerational correlations if children are taken at the beginning of their 
adulthood or from their 40s and up. They explain this pattern trough lifecycle 
variations in transfers, earnings and consumption. More specifically, wealthy 
parents are likely to make a larger amount of transfers early in children’s life. 
Subsequently, their children have low current income when investing in human 
capital, but higher expected permanent income than other individuals their age.  
2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. Imputed intergenerational wealth elasticity 
As it has been largely explained in Chapter 1, the TSTSLS method has been 
largely used to provide estimates of mobility when data on economic status which 
cover two generations are not available. Instead of estimating fathers’ earnings and 
the intergenerational earnings elasticity as it is common in the empirical literature, 
this chapter uses the TSTSLS method to impute parental wealth and evaluate the 
degree of persistence of wealth across generations, together with its 
intergenerational transmission channels. Unlike the literature on intergenerational 
income mobility which usually estimate the correlation between fathers’ and sons’ 
economic status, the empirical literature on intergenerational wealth mobility, use 
wealth of both parents as a measure of economic status of the first generation and 
do not exclude women from the second generation.  
The TSTSLS methodology implemented in this chapter uses a sample of adult 
children that report some retrospective information about parents and an 
independent sample of pseudo-parents to estimate the intergenerational wealth 
elasticity in a two-stage approach.  In the first stage, the same set of socio-economic 
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characteristics of parents reported by adult children is exploited in the sample of 
pseudo-parents to predict net wealth: 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑝
= 𝛼 + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑝
+ 𝜔𝑖,𝑡                                                 (3)                                                  
 
where  𝑊𝑖
𝑝𝑝
  is the yearly wealth of pseudo-parents, 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑝
 is a vector of socio-
economic characteristics of pseudo-parents and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is a disturbance.  
In the second stage, the estimated coefficient 𝜃 allow us to predict wealth of actual 
parents i.e.  ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 = 𝜃 𝑍𝑖
𝑃. The IWE is thus estimated this way: 
 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̂?𝑖
𝑃 +  𝜔𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                            (4)                                          
 
where  𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑂   is the logarithm of offspring’s wealth,  ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 = 𝜃 𝑍𝑖
𝑃 is the imputed 
parental wealth and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control which include age and age squared of 
offspring to consider the influence of age on both the process of accumulation and 
the probability of receiving bequests from parents as individuals get older.  
As it is common in the literature on wealth mobility, I want to use parental wealth 
as a measure of economic status of the first generation. Thus, I exploit several socio-
economic characteristics of both parents which are likely to predict their permanent 
economic status. More specifically, I take educational attainments, work status and 
an age polynomial of both parents plus the region of residence of the family of 
origin as predictors in the first stage regression. All socio-economic characteristics 
taken to impute parental wealth are commonly used in the empirical literature on 
mobility for their capacity to predict lifetime socio-economic status of parents. 
Obviously, as when the TSTSLS method is used to predict income of the first 
generation, I am likely to make some errors in predicting wealth of the first 
generation if the set of auxiliary variables is not able to capture part of the variance 
related to any characteristic of individuals which is correlated across generations10.  
                                               
10 Most of studies which use the TSTSLS to impute income of the first generation exploit either 
educational attainments or educational attainments and other socio-economic characteristics in the 
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In order to compare the probability limit of the imputed estimator to the one that 
I could have been obtained if data of actual wealth of parents were available, it is 
possible to exploit an approach similar to the one described by Olivetti & Paserman 
(2015) in their study on intergenerational mobility in the US. In particular, I can 
express offspring’s wealth and parental wealth in the following forms: 
 
𝑤𝑖
𝑂 = 𝛽𝑤𝑖
𝑃 +  𝜑𝑖
𝑃 + 𝜖𝑖                                         (5) 
 
𝑤𝑖
𝑃 = 𝜃𝑍𝑖
𝑃 + 𝜔𝑖                                              (6) 
 
where, as in previous equations, 𝑤𝑖
𝑂 is offspring’s wealth, 𝑤𝑖
𝑃 is net wealth of actual 
parents, 𝑍𝑖
𝑃 is the vector of socio-economic characteristics used to predict parental 
wealth in the sample of pseudo-parents and ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 = 𝜃𝑍𝑖
𝑃 is the imputed wealth of 
parents.   
The direct influence of all socio-economic characteristics used to predict 
parental wealth on offspring’s wealth is captured by 𝜑𝑖
𝑃, and by construction 𝜔𝑖 is 
uncorrelated to ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 and 𝜑𝑖
𝑃. Then, it is possible to decompose 𝜖𝑖 in a component 
which may be correlated to ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 and one which is not, such that 𝜖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖. For 
instance, ?̂?𝑖
𝑃 may be correlated to 𝑐𝑖  if most skilled parents (i.e. the ones with a 
better combination of socio-economic characteristics) transmit their cognitive and 
non-cognitive abilities to their children which can be useful to obtain higher lifetime 
incomes and wealth accumulation later during the lifecycle.  
Thus, the probability limit of the “actual” estimator (i.e. the one obtained if 
actual parental wealth were available) is: 
 
?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑝
→
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤𝑖
𝑂, 𝑤𝑖
𝑃)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑤𝑖
𝑃)
= 𝛽 +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜑𝑖
𝑃+𝑐𝑖,?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜔𝑖) 
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖,𝜔𝑖  )
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜔𝑖)
            (7)       
 
                                               
first stage regression. In the last few years, many studies on intergenerational mobility started using 
surnames (see Barone & Mocetti, or names to predict the socio-economic status of the older 
generation.  
52 
 
 As expected,  ?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  do not capture any causal effect of parental wealth on 
offspring’s wealth (i.e. the 𝛽  coefficient) because of unobservables which are 
correlated across generations11.  
On the contrary, the probability limit of the “imputed” estimator (i.e. the one 
obtained by implementing the TSTSLS method) is: 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑝
→
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤𝑖
𝑂, ?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
=
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜔𝑖)
𝛽 +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜑𝑖
𝑃+𝑐𝑖,?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
𝑃)
               (8) 
 
Therefore, the “imputed” estimator may be different from the “actual” estimator 
because of different reasons. For instance, the first component of equation 8 
captures the classical attenuation bias due to measurement errors in the imputation 
of parental wealth12. A second attenuation bias may occur if the set of socio-
economic characteristics is not able to capture other characteristics of individuals 
(e.g. soft skills, social networks, cultural factors, cognitive and non-cognitive 
abilities), which are positively correlated across generations (i.e. the last term in 
equation 7 is not present in equation 8). Finally, the second term in equation 8 is 
larger than the second term in equation 7 if the variance of the imputed parental 
wealth is lower than the variance of the wealth of actual parents.  
According to this framework, the “imputed” estimator may be either higher or 
lower than the “actual” estimator depending on the size of each different component 
of equation 8 compared to the corresponding term in equation 7. In any case, the 
difference between the “actual” estimator and the imputed “estimator” should 
become lower as the unexplained component of parental wealth decreases (i.e. the 
higher the fraction of the variance explained from the set of auxiliary variables 
exploited to predict parental wealth is, the lower the bias will be).  
                                               
11 Studies on mobility are usually not intended to obtain the causal effect of parental economic 
status on offspring’s economic status. This the reason why I am comparing the “imputed” estimator 
to the “actual” estimator without requiring any exclusion restriction to hold. 
12 Observe however that the attenuation bias may be higher if adult children make some errors 
when reporting retrospective information of their parents. The consistency of the two-sample 
estimator relies on an additional point: auxiliary variables used in the first stage should have the 
same distribution in both the sample of pseudo-parents and the sample of offspring even though the 
TSTSLS approach automatically corrects for differences (Inoue and Solon 2010). 
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Usually the TSTSLS method it is assumed to perform well at estimating 
intergenerational income mobility. Therefore, I evaluate if auxiliary variables can 
do an equally good job at predicting parental wealth by comparing the R2 of the first 
stage regression with those obtained by Mocetti (2007) and Piraino (2007) in their 
studies on income mobility in Italy. Moreover, as a further robustness check, I 
evaluate to what extent the estimated IWE changes as different predictors are taken 
to impute parental wealth in the first stage regression.  
2.2.2. Imputed rank-rank slope 
An important disadvantage of using elasticities to measure intergenerational 
wealth mobility is that they automatically exclude negative or zero wealth 
individuals because of the logarithm transformation. This may cause a selection 
problem if the intergenerational correlation is not stable across the wealth 
distribution (Boserup et al., 2013, Black et al., 2015; Adermon et al., 2015). For 
instance, excluding the lower tail of the wealth distribution will under 
(over)estimate the level of mobility if the actual level of intergenerational mobility 
is higher (lower) at the bottom of the distribution than in the remaining part of the 
distribution. 
A way to overcome this kind of selection problem is to measure wealth mobility 
by using rank-rank slopes which, as described in chapter 1, are usually obtained by 
estimating the following equation:  
 
𝑝𝑜 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀                                              ( 9) 
 
where 𝑝𝑜  is the percentile of offspring’s wealth in their own distribution and 𝑝𝑝 is 
the percentile of parental wealth. In this empirical framework, an estimated 𝛾 of 0.5 
means that the expected difference in ranks between offspring would be about 5 
percentiles if the difference in ranks among their parents was 10 percentiles. 
However, it is not possible to estimate rank-rank slopes by simply re-categorizing 
wealth of the two generations when data on wealth of actual parents are not 
54 
 
available. For this reason, I use a different approach consisting in two different 
steps.  
Firstly, I obtain a prediction of parental wealth by exploiting the sample of 
pseudo-parents and the same set of auxiliary variables used for obtaining TSTSLS 
estimates of the IWE. Secondly, predicted parental wealth is percentile ranked so 
that I can estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑝𝑜 = 𝛼 + 𝛾?̂?𝑝 + 𝜀                                              (10) 
 
where 𝑝𝑜  is the percentile of offspring’s wealth in their own distribution and ?̂?𝑝 is 
the imputed percentile of parental wealth. This approach, except for the set of 
auxiliary variables used in the first step, is very close to the ones used by Olivetti 
et al. (2016) and Barone and Mocetti (2016) to obtain intergenerational and 
multigenerational rank-rank measures of economic mobility13.  
Consider however, that from a statistical point of view, it is not easy to 
understand to what extent this imputed rank-rank slope can be compared to rank-
rank slopes estimates obtained by percentile ranking wealth of actual parents. 
Obviously, when rank are imputed, I am likely to make some errors in placing all 
parents in the right percentile of their wealth distribution. For this reason, estimates 
obtained by using imputed rank are likely to be affected by attenuation bias. This 
kind of rank measurement errors cannot be intended as “classical” since both the 
dependent variable and the regressor in equation 10 are uniformly distributed. More 
specifically, the correlation between actual and imputed rank is, by definition, 
between the value of 0 and 1 such that, if parental rank is measured without error, 
then the correlation will be equal to one and the greater the error is the lower the 
correlation between actual and imputed rank will be. This means that this kind of 
measurement error is negatively correlated with actual rank of parents (Nybom and 
Stuhler, 2016).  
                                               
13 Olivetti et al. (2016) impute father’s and grandfather’s income rank, which is unobserved, 
using the average income of fathers of children with a given first name. Barone and Mocetti (2016) 
use surnames to track families over different generations and obtain imputed rank-rank slopes.  
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Nevertheless, the measurement error related to the imputation of ranks should 
be lower than the measurement error related to the imputation of continuous values 
since imputation errors decrease as the categories to be imputed become lower14 
(Jerrim et al., 2016). In any case, I will test the robustness of estimated rank-rank 
slopes to different sets of socio-economic characteristics considered to impute 
parental wealth. 
2.3. Data and Sample Selection 
2.3.1. Data source 
As in previous studies on intergenerational economic mobility in Italy, I use data 
from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a 
representative survey of the Italian population which is available annually from 
1977 to 1987 and every two years after 1987. It is usually considered as the best 
source of income distribution data in Italy and, starting from the wave of 1987, it 
also collects both real and financial wealth data at the household level. Another 
relevant aspect of the SHIW is that, starting from the wave of 1995, respondents, 
who are heads of the household, are asked to report some characteristics of their 
parents when the latter were approximately the same age as the former. Some of 
these retrospective characteristics such as educational attainments, employment 
status and age are taken in this chapter to predict parental wealth. 
Net wealth is recorded on an annual basis and obtained as the sum of real and 
financial assets minus financial liabilities. All economic variables are deflated by 
the consumer price index. A detailed list of all real/financial assets and financial 
liabilities used to obtain household wealth showed in appendix B. 
2.3.2. Sample Selection  
Ideally, one would have used permanent, instead of current, measures of 
economic status for both generations to measure intergenerational economic 
                                               
14 Jerrim et al. (2016) show that the imputed intergenerational correlation is generally less biased 
than the imputed elasticity even when economic status of parents is not ranked. This is due to the 
fact that the variance of the percentile ranked actual-wealth is equal, by construction, to the variance 
of the percentile ranked imputed-wealth    
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mobility. Unfortunately, data which cover two generations over their entire 
lifecycle are usually not available.  For this reason, it is well acknowledged in the 
literature on earnings or income mobility that obtaining estimated elasticities which 
are not affected by lifecycle measurement errors is a non-trivial exercise. In fact, 
despite the classical measurement error assumption, both left-hand and right-hand 
side errors may affect the consistency of the elasticity. Therefore, Haider and Solon 
(2006), suggest taking offspring around 40 years old to minimize measurement 
errors related to lifecycle when using current instead of permanent variables, even 
if age controls are included in the specification.  
However, when moving to analyse the extent of wealth correlation across 
generations, it is not clear which is the optimal age to choose. Many life-cycle 
accumulation models predict wealth to be hump shaped over an individual’s 
lifetime (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). There is also some empirical evidence 
showing that wealth accumulation reaches its peak at retirement age, since assets 
are usually accumulated over the working age and decline after retirement age (see 
OECD, 2008; Finance and Network, 2013). Moreover, the probability of receiving 
direct transfers is high for young children coming from wealthy households and 
becomes higher as individuals get older because of bequests. With all this in mind, 
I try to select the two generations into sample by not considering too young 
individuals in the baseline model. However, I cannot select retired individuals since 
I would have needed information on their occupational status when they were 
employed. Unfortunately, this kind of information is not present in the dataset. 
The sample of pseudo-parents is taken from the wave of 1989 which is the first 
one that contains information on both real and financial wealth at the household 
level and educational attainments of both employed and unemployed pseudo-
parents. The baseline estimates are provided by including all households composed 
by an employed father15 aged 40 to 54, a mother aged 35 to 54 and at least one child 
in the wave of 1989. On the contrary, the sample of offspring is taken from the 
waves of 2010 and 2012 which are the latest two which contain all background 
                                               
15 This kind of exclusion is a common procedure when using the TSTSLS method since 
unemployment of fathers is often transitory. 
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information about parents. I include all employed heads of the household aged 35 
to 48 whose fathers were employed at the same age for a final sample of 1158 
offspring and 2062 pseudo-parents16. Since financial wealth is measured in both 
samples at the household rather than at the personal level, I will estimate different 
specifications to evaluate the robustness of the results to this kind of potential 
source of bias.  
2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics in table 2.1 show that offspring and pseudo-parents are 
taken on average in their 40s. This selection into sample is likely to prevent our 
estimates to be downward biased as offspring and pseudo-parents are not too young.  
Table 2.1 also presents summary statistics on wealth levels and dispersion in the 
two full samples which show that the wealth dispersion in Italy has increased over 
the last two decades. For instance, the ratio between the 90th and the 10th percentile 
(p90/p10) of the wealth distribution rose dramatically from 64 in the sample of 
pseudo-parents to 384 in the sample of offspring. Nearly all this variation is to be 
ascribed to an increase in the p50/p10 rather than in the p90/p50 ratio: while the 
former is about 6 times higher in the sample of offspring than in the sample of 
pseudo-parents, the latter remained basically stable during the period. Increasing 
inequality in the lower tail of the net wealth distribution is likely to be closely 
related to the growth of financial liabilities: over the last two decades, the share of 
households with zero or negative net wealth rose from 2.7 to 7.1 percentage points. 
Regarding wealth dispersion in the upper tail of the distribution, the p99/p90 ratio 
has increased from 2.59 to 3.91 across the two generations. 
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics of the final sample used to estimate IWE 
after the logarithm transformation which excludes zero or negative wealth 
individuals. The extent of wealth dispersion in this subsample is obviously lower 
than the one showed in the full sample since less wealthy households are now 
                                               
16 I cannot select older offspring since I am able to measure their wealth only 21 years after 
pseudo-parents’ wealth.   
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excluded. In this case, the p90/p10 ratio remains basically stable across the two 
generations.  
 
Table 2.1: Two-Sample Descriptive Statistics (Full sample) 
 Pseudo-Parents Offspring Sign of the Variation 
Age (Mean) 45.61 41.49  
 (4.15) (3.67)  
    
Percentiles of Net Wealth:    
p1 -3255.20 -9700.00 - 
p5 1583.41 -486.04 - 
p10 4715.08 1000.00 - 
p25 18209.19 12812.92 - 
p50 78875.77 96401.10 + 
p75 164871.90 202983.80 + 
p90 305527.70 384500.00 + 
p95 440607.00 519971.50 + 
p99 792127.90 1506128.00 + 
    
Average Net wealth 127472.72 164302.01 + 
 (172738.66) (275969.20)  
    
Zero/Negative Wealth  2.7% 7.1% + 
    
Observations 2062 1158  
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Standard deviations in parenthesis. All economic variables are expressed at 2010 
prices 
 
On the contrary, a slight increase of the wealth dispersion across generations can 
be seen in the upper tail of the distribution. Finally, it is important to note that the 
average age of the two generations does not change moving from the full sample to 
the sub-sample of positive wealth households. 
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Table 2.2: Two-Sample Descriptive Statistics after the logarithmic transformation 
 Pseudo-Parents Offspring Sign of the Variation 
Age 45.60 41.49  
 (4.16) (3.67)  
    
Percentiles of Net Wealth:    
p1 6.67 6.19 - 
p5 8.05 7.60 - 
p10 8.76 8.49 - 
p25 10.03 10.10 + 
p50 11.31 11.57 + 
p75 12.04 12.26 + 
p90 12.65 12.89 + 
p95 13.00 13.18 + 
p99 13.58 14.25 + 
    
Log Net wealth  10.95 11.11 + 
 (1.57) (1.76)  
    
Observations 2007 1076  
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Standard deviations in parenthesis. All economic variables are expressed at 2010 
prices 
2.5. Estimated elasticities 
This section reports estimates of the intergenerational wealth elasticity in Italy. 
I perform the TSTSLS method by exploiting a set of parental characteristics given 
by offspring in the surveys of 2010 and 2012, that can be used to predict their 
parents’ wealth. More specifically, I use 5 education categories of both father and 
mother (none, elementary, lower secondary, upper secondary and university 
degree), 6 occupational qualifications of fathers (production worker, teacher or 
clerical worker, junior manager, manager, member of the arts or professions, other 
self-employee), 5 occupational qualifications of mothers17 (not employed, 
production worker, teacher or clerical worker, manager or junior manager, self-
employer/member of the arts),  region of residence (Piemonte, Lombardia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, 
                                               
17 Excluding not employed mothers would have reduced significantly the sample dimension.     
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Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Molise, Abruzzo, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia  Calabria, 
Sicilia, Sardegna) and a third grade polynomial for age of both parents. Since the 
region of residence is reported only for pseudo-parents, I use the offspring’s region 
of birth as a proxy of the region of residence of actual parents18.  
Table 2.17 in the appendix reports the whole set of auxiliary variables used to 
predict parental wealth and some first stage post-estimation statistics. In particular, 
the R2 of the first stage regression equal to 0.28 suggests that the set of auxiliary 
variables performs pretty well at predicting parental wealth. In fact, the estimated 
R2 is not that far from the ones obtained by Piraino (2007) and Mocetti (2007) in 
their first-stage regressions implemented to predict fathers’ income19. 
The usual way to obtain elasticities in the second stage, is to regress the 
logarithm of offspring’s wealth on the logarithm of parental wealth, such as it is 
formalised in equation 4. This commonly used approach excludes all observations 
lower than or equal to zero. In this case, the TSTSLS age-adjusted intergenerational 
wealth elasticity estimate is 0.499 (table 2.3, column 1). This means that a 10 
percent variation in parental wealth is associated with a 4.99 percent variation in 
offspring’s.  
Since data on financial net wealth of offspring are available only at the household 
level, I am overestimating the IWE if those adult children with a better economic 
background are more likely to marry wealthy partners boosting their overall 
household wealth. I try to reduce this potential source of bias by controlling for a 
proxy of the amount of personal saving capacity over household saving capacity. 
In particular, I control for the fraction of personal disposable income of the head 
over total household disposable income. The main assumption is that personal 
financial wealth and household financial wealth are more likely to be equal as the 
fraction of personal disposable income of the head over total household disposable 
income increases. This derive from the fact that the personal capacity of accumulate 
wealth is strongly correlated to personal lifetime income. Observe however, that 
                                               
18 The distribution of parental socio-economic characteristics in the two samples is reported in 
table 2.16 in the appendix A  
19 The R2 of the first stage regression is 0.301 in the study of Mocetti (2007) and 0.322 in that of 
Piraino (2007).  
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this kind of control is not perfect. For instance, it may not work if at least a fraction 
of financial wealth at the household level is inherited by members other than the 
head of the household.  
Table 2.3 (column 2) reports an estimated IWE of 0.451 when the fraction of 
personal disposable income of the head over total household disposable income is 
included in the specification. This result seems to confirm that some mechanisms 
related to assortative mating were likely to bias the estimated elasticity obtained 
without adding this control variable. A further way of controlling for this potential 
source of bias is to use personal estate wealth as a proxy of total personal net wealth, 
measured as the sum of all personal estate assets minus the total amount of 
mortgages. The IWE reported in the third column of table 2.3 seems to confirm that 
estimated elasticities seem to be robust to the use of household financial wealth 
instead of personal financial wealth. 
Table 2.3: Estimated intergenerational wealth elasticities 
 [1] [2] [3]a 
Parental net wealth 0.499*** 0.451***  
 [0.061] [0.061]  
    
Parental estate wealth   0.478*** 
   [0.074] 
    
Pers. income share   Yes  
R-squared 0.078 0.124 0.062 
Obs. 1076 1076 729 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. a Personal estate wealth is 
used as a dependent variable instead of total net wealth. All regressions include offspring’s age and age squared as a control.     
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The main advantage of estimating the IWE by using a classical log-log 
specification is that it is possible to compare the obtained elasticity with most of 
previous estimates for other countries, which are based on the same transformation 
(table 2.4). More specifically, the degree of wealth mobility appears to be lower in 
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Italy than in France (Arrondel, 2008), Norway (Fageren et al., 2015), Denmark 
(Boserup et al., 2013), Sweden (Adermon et al., 2015; Black et al., 2015) and close 
to the values of 0.37 and 0.41 obtained for the United States by Charles and Hurst 
(2003) and Pfeffer and Killewald (2015). However, this kind of comparison should 
be taken carefully since the studies listed in table 2.4 use actual rather than imputed 
parental wealth.   
Table 2.4: Intergenerational wealth mobility: cross-country comparison  
Country Source Parent’s Age Offspring’s Age IWE  R2R 
US 
Charles and Hurst 
(2003) 
52 37.5 0.37 / 
US 
Pfeffer and 
Killewald 
(2015) 
43.4 44.6 0.41 0.37 
Italy Current 45.6 41.5 0.45 0.35 
Denmark 
Boserup et al. 
(2013) 
48.6 33.9 0.27 0.23 
Denmark 
Boserup et al. 
(2016) 
47.9 47.2 0.24 0.27 
Sweden 
Adermon et al. 
(2015) 
57-63 42-49 0.32 0.39 
Sweden 
Black et al. 
(2015) 
63.9 43.8 / 0.35 
Norway 
Fageren et al. 
(2015) 
62.7 36.1 0.2 0.18 
France 
Arrondel 
(2009) 
58.9 33.8 0.22 / 
 
2.5.1. IWE: Robustness check 
A usual way to test the robustness of estimated elasticities based on imputed 
values is to check how the elasticity changes as a single socio-economic predictor 
of parental wealth is excluded from the first stage regression20. Results presented in 
Appendix A (table 2.18) show that the estimated elasticity tends to be stable in all 
cases but when fathers’ occupational qualification is excluded from the set of 
                                               
20 I perform the Sargan test to evaluate if the full set of instruments used in the first stage in 
uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage regression. Even though the test does not reject 
the null hypothesis, I can hardly assume that the set of auxiliary variables is exogenous.  
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predictors in the first stage regression. This result may suggest a direct correlation 
between this auxiliary variable and offspring’s wealth. Nevertheless, excluding 
occupational qualification of the father reduces substantially the variance of 
predicted parental wealth: the first stage R2 in this case is 0.167 (i.e. 0.11 lower than 
when all auxiliary variables are included in the first stage). Hence, imputed parental 
wealth seems to be less accurate when the occupational qualification of the father 
is not used as a predictor in the first stage regression.  
Another way to test the robustness of the results is to evaluate how the elasticity 
changes as different measures of wealth of the two generations are used. Results 
presented in table 2.5 show that the estimated elasticity is extremely stable across 
different specifications either taking total net wealth (column 1) or estate/non-estate 
wealth (column 2/3) as a measure of economic status of both generations. 
Interestingly, the estimated elasticity remains stable even though the prediction 
ability of the set of auxiliary variables used in the first stage increases when non-
estate wealth rather than total net wealth is taken as a measure of economic status. 
In particular, the R2 of the first stage regression rises to 0.395 using non-estate 
wealth (table 2.17).  
Table 2.5: IWE by different measures of wealth   
 [1] [2]a [3]b 
Parental Net Wealth 0.451***   
 [0.061]   
    
Parental Estate Wealth  0.478***  
  [0.074]  
    
Parental Non-Estate 
Wealth 
  0.455*** 
   [0.049] 
R-squared 0.124 0.064 0.170 
First stage R-squared 0.278 0.240 0.395 
Obs. 1076 729 1027 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. aEstate wealth is used as a 
dependent variable instead of total net wealth. bFinancial wealth is used as a dependent variable instead of total net wealth. 
All regressions include, as further controls, offspring’s age, age squared and the ratio between personal income and total 
household income. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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2.6. Intergenerational transmission of wealth across the distribution 
Although the elasticity is useful to summarize the degree of persistence of wealth 
across generations, it gives no information about the pattern of wealth transmission 
at different points of the distribution. A low level of mobility may be associated to 
the lack of opportunities of the poor as well as to the persistence of wealth at the 
top. There are many recent studies showing a higher intergenerational transmission 
of income and earnings at the top (e.g. Björklund et al. 2012) or stronger 
intergenerational correlations at higher positions in the parental wealth distribution 
(Charles and Hurst, 2003; Killewald, 2013; Hansen, 2014; Pfeffer and Killewald 
2015, Adermon et al. 2015).  As in many previous studies on economic mobility, I 
evaluate the pattern of mobility along the wealth distribution by computing the 
offspring’s probability of ending up in a specific quintile of the wealth distribution 
given the quintile of their parents (figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: Probability of ending in a specific quintile of the wealth distribution 
given the quintile of parental wealth 
 
 Author's elaboration based on the SHIW.  
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Results show that in Italy for each quintile of the wealth distribution, offspring 
are more likely to ends up in the same quintile as their parents (diagonal 
probabilities are all greater than 20 percent). In any case, the degree of persistence 
of wealth across generations is higher at the top and at the bottom of the distribution: 
38 percent of offspring whose parents were collocated in the highest quintile of the 
distribution remains in the same quintile and about 60 percent in one of the highest 
two quintiles. Conversely, only about 12 percent of offspring from the best parental 
wealth background ends up in the worst wealth quintile.  
The degree of persistence is also high at the bottom-end of the wealth 
distribution: about 52 percent of offspring coming from the lowest quintile of the 
parental wealth distribution ends up in one of the bottom two quintiles and only 
about 12 percent makes its way to the top.  
2.7. Estimated Rank-Rank slope 
As already specified, the disadvantage of using elasticities to measure 
intergenerational wealth mobility is that they automatically exclude negative or 
zero wealth individuals. This may cause a selection problem if the intergenerational 
correlation is not stable across the wealth distribution. This is the reason why, I 
estimate also rank-rank slopes with or without zero and negative wealth 
individuals21.  
Results are obtained by estimating equation 10 and are reported in Table 2.6. 
According to imputed rank-rank slopes, the degree of intergenerational wealth 
mobility seems to be slightly higher when negative or zero wealth households are 
not excluded from the analysis. This difference seems to confirm results presented 
in figure 2.1 which suggested that the degree of intergenerational mobility is not 
stable across the wealth distribution, with lower mobility at the top and the bottom 
of the distribution. In any case, the selection bias due to the exclusion of the lower 
tail of the wealth distribution doesn’t appear to be huge since the fraction of 
                                               
21 Within a birth cohort, ranks are calculated as ((i − 0.5)/N) · 100, where i denotes individuals 
sorted by wealth and i = 1, 2,…,N.  A small random number is added to the wealth of each individual 
to ensure that all individuals may be ranked.  
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indebted households in Italy is not high compared to other countries such as Sweden 
(Davies, 2009).  
As already said in previous sections, when one tries to impute parental rank he 
is likely to make some errors so that estimated rank-rank slopes may be downward 
biased because of non-classical measurement error. This is the reason why one 
should be cautious in comparing the rank-rank slopes obtained in this chapter to the 
ones obtained in previous studies for other countries which exploit actual instead of 
imputed rank of the first generation. 
 Table 2.6: Rank slopes by including/excluding zero or negative wealth individuals 
 [Full Sample] [Excl. zero/negative wealth households] 
Parental Rank 0.349*** 0.312*** 
 [0.029] [0.029] 
R-squared 0.122 0.096 
Obs. 1158 1076 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Both offspring’s wealth 
and parental wealth are percentile ranked by offspring and parents birth cohort. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
In any case, although measurement errors related to the imputation of the 
economic status of the first generations is likely to be lower for rank based 
measures, I evaluate the robustness of the estimated rank-rank slope to the set of 
auxiliary variables used to predict parental wealth and impute parental rank. 
Therefore, different estimates of the rank-rank slope are obtained by excluding a 
single predictor of parental wealth at a time from the first stage regression. Results 
reported in table 2.19 in appendix A show that the estimated rank-rank slope is 
extremely robust to the exclusion of each single predictor at a time in the first stage 
regression. More specifically, its value is comprised between 0.322 and 0.350 using 
different sets of auxiliary variables. This result seems to suggest that rank-rank 
slopes are even more robust to the selection of different socio-economic predictors 
than elasticities. 
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2.8. The pattern of intergenerational wealth mobility over the lifecycle  
Estimates of the intergenerational economic mobility, are usually sensitive to the 
age at which the economic status of the two generations is observed (Grawe, 2006, 
Haider and Solon, 2006, Nybom and Stuhler, 2016) In particular, estimates of 
income mobility are assumed to be downward biased if economic status is measured 
at early stages of the second generation’s career. Thus, Haider and Solon (2006) 
suggest offspring should be around 40 years old to minimize measurement errors 
related to lifecycle when using current instead of permanent variables, even if age 
controls are included in the specification.  
In the case of intergenerational wealth mobility, there is a lack of evidence 
regarding the optimal age at which wealth of the two generations should be 
measured. For instance, most of studies listed in table 2.4 do not observe the two 
generations of parents and offspring in the same age. This is the reason why 
estimates of intergenerational wealth mobility obtained in the literature could be 
downward biased if too young offspring have had no enough time to accumulate 
the same amount of wealth as its parents.  
The only empirical study which tries to assess the pattern of intergenerational 
wealth correlation as a function of offspring’s age is that by Boserup et al (2016). 
Contrary to expectations, they find a U-shaped pattern of intergenerational wealth 
correlation as a function of child age in Denmark, with higher intergenerational 
correlations obtained if offspring are taken when they are very young or from their 
40s and up. They explain the pattern of intergenerational wealth mobility over the 
life-cycle through life-cycle patterns in transfers, earnings and consumption. More 
specifically, wealthy parents are likely to make a larger amount of transfers early 
in offspring’s life. Subsequently their children have low current income when 
investing in human capital, but high permanent income (see chapter 1) 
To test this theoretical assumption, I re-estimate the intergenerational wealth 
elasticity and rank-rank slope by using three different samples of offspring by age. 
In a first estimate, I consider a sample of offspring aged 22 to 34 whose wealth is 
measured in the waves of 2000 and 2002 and 2004. Then, I raise the age at which 
offspring’s wealth is measured by considering individuals aged 27 to 37 in the 
68 
 
waves of 2004, 2006 and 200822. I thus compare these two obtained elasticities and 
rank-rank slopes to baseline estimates obtained in all the rest of the chapter by 
considering adult children aged 35 to 48 whose wealth is measured in the waves of 
2010 and 2012. 
Results reported in table 2.7 and 2.8 seem to confirm results provided by Boserup 
et al. (2016) with higher intergenerational correlations obtained when the second 
generation is very young or around 40s. In particular, the estimated IWE is 0.474 
when adult children are 22 to 34, 0.409 when they are 27 to 37 and 0.451 when they 
are 35 to 48.  
Table 2.7: IWE by different age of offspring 
 [22-34] [27-37] [35-48] 
Log Parental Wealth 0.474*** 0.409*** 0.451*** 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] 
R-squared 0.173 0.129 0.120 
Obs. 728 657 1116 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. All regressions include, 
offspring’s age, age squared and the ratio between personal income and total household income as a control. Wealth of the 
youngest generation is measured in the waves of 2000, 2002 and 2004. Wealth of the medium generation is measured in the 
waves of 2004, 2006 and 2008. Wealth of the oldest generation is measured in the waves of 2010 and 2012. * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
A similar pattern of mobility is obtained looking at the estimated rank-rank 
correlation which is 0.383 for the youngest sample, 0.289 when children are 27 to 
37 and 0.349 when the second generation is around 40 years old. Thus, unlike the 
case of intergenerational income or earnings mobility, the pattern of wealth 
mobility over the lifecycle is confirmed to be U-shaped. More specifically, 
estimates seem to be downward biased only if wealth of the second generation is 
measured when adult children are at early stages of their careers but not too young.  
                                               
22 These two different samples of offspring by age are selected such that the distribution of the 
socio-economic characteristics taken to predict parental wealth in the first stage is similar in the 
sample of offspring and of pseudo-parents. 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to evaluate the pattern of intergenerational 
wealth correlation by using older offspring because of data limitations. However, 
intergenerational correlations are likely to be higher if individuals of the second 
generation are selected after their parents die because of the role of inheritances. In 
any case, if the main goal of an empirical analysis is to estimate the degree of 
lifetime intergenerational wealth correlation, it seems to be better to select both 
parents and offspring around 40 years old as suggested by Boserup et al. (2016)  
Table 2.8: Rank-Rank slope by different age of offspring 
 [22-34] [27-37] [35-48] 
Parental Rank 0.383*** 0.289*** 0.349*** 
 [0.034] [0.036] [0.029] 
R-squared 0.146 0.083 0.118 
Obs. 771 693 1201 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Both offspring’s wealth 
and parental wealth are percentile ranked by offspring and parents birth cohort. Wealth of the youngest generation is measured 
in the waves of 2000, 2002 and 2004. Wealth of the medium generation is measured in the waves of 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
Wealth of the oldest generation is measured in the waves of 2010 and 2012. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2.9. Geographical differences in intergenerational wealth mobility 
In this section, I evaluate to what extent intergenerational wealth mobility 
changes between different areas of Italy. Ideally, I should estimate regional 
differences in intergenerational elasticities and rank-rank slopes to obtain a detailed 
picture of geographical differences in wealth mobility. Unfortunately, the sample 
of offspring is not as large as it is needed to obtain 20 different estimates of wealth 
mobility by region. This is the reason why I decided to compare intergenerational 
wealth mobility by considering only two different areas in Italy, north/centre and 
south/islands. These two areas are commonly assumed to be very different in terms 
of social and economic structure and levels of familism which is likely to strongly 
influence offspring’s economic opportunities in the labour market and the amount 
of savings for inheritance purposes.  
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Results reported in table 2.9 show large differences in intergenerational wealth 
elasticities by offspring’ area of residence with higher estimated mobility in the 
northern/central area of the country than in the southern. More specifically, the IWE 
is twice as high in the southern part of Italy as in the northern/central part of the 
country. This means that a 10 percent variation of parental wealth is correlated to a 
3.16 percent variation in offspring’s wealth considering the North/Centre of Italy 
and to 6.21 percentage variation considering the South/Islands 
 
Table 2.9: Estimated IWE by offspring’s area of residence 
 [North/Centre] [South/Islands] Difference 
Parental Net Wealth 0.316*** 0.621*** 0.306** 
 [0.071] [0.119] [0.133] 
R-squared 0.03 0.152  
Obs. 738 338  
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. All regressions include 
offspring’s age and age squared as a control.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The lower degree of intergenerational wealth mobility in the southern part of 
Italy is also confirmed from results presented in table 2.10. In this case, I evaluate 
geographical differences in wealth mobility using estimated rank-rank slopes that 
are usually considered to be particularly appropriate to compare different areas. 
This is because, as stated by Mazudmer (2005b), an estimated elasticity in a specific 
area or region would be informative about the rate of regression to the mean of 
wealth in that area. On the contrary, rank estimators can use ranks that are fixed to 
the national distribution.  
Results presented in table 2.10 show that the rank-rank slope is about 0.15 points 
higher in the South/Islands than in the North/Centre of Italy. However, these 
estimated geographical differences in the extent of wealth mobility across 
generations do not consider spatial mobility as a possible source of bias. In 
particular, many individuals who reside in the northern Italy (i.e. the most 
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developed area of the country) were born in less developed regions and moved to 
the north for educational reasons or to get well paid jobs. Therefore, I re-estimate 
rank-rank slopes by including a dummy for spatial mobility which assumes the 
value of one if adult children reside in a different area with respect to the one where 
they were born. Results showed in table 2.20 in Appendix A are very close to the 
ones obtained without controlling for spatial mobility. In any case, this is only an 
imperfect way of controlling for geographical mobility since individuals may move 
many times during their adulthood for both educational and occupational reasons. 
  Table 2.10: Estimated Rank-Rank slope by offspring’s area of residence 
 [North/Centre] [South/Islands] 
Parental Net Wealth 0.289*** 0.407*** 
 [0.037] [0.048] 
R-squared 0.082 0.162 
Obs. 777 381 
 Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Both offspring’s wealth 
and parental wealth are percentile ranked by offspring and parents birth cohort. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2.10. The mediation role of different intergenerational channels 
As discussed in section 2.2, there are mainly three different factors that may 
explain why wealth is positively associated across generations. First, bequests or 
inter-vivos transfers may directly increase wealth if they are received from the 
previous generation. Indirectly, wealth may be correlated across generations 
through income and/or educational attainments since wealthy parents may have 
higher cognitive or non-cognitive abilities that can be transmitted to their children 
or greater opportunities of investment in their children’s human capital (Becker and 
Tomes 1979 and 1986). The latter two channels may dramatically increase 
economic outcomes of offspring once they enter the labour market and thus the rate 
of lifetime wealth accumulation. Lastly, preferences such as risk propensity or 
attitudes toward future may as well be transmitted from parents to offspring 
influencing their saving propensity or the rate of return of investments. 
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The usual way to decompose the intergenerational wealth elasticity into different 
mediating factors is to re-estimate the equation 4 (i.e. the baseline elasticity 
obtained without controlling for any mediating variable) with some additional 
controls included in the vector 𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 23: 
 
         𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2?̂?𝑖
𝑃 + 𝜎𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 + 𝜔𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                  [11]                   
 
The main assumption is that if a mediating variable is positively correlated with 
both parental and offspring’s wealth, then the estimated elasticity will fall once this 
control is included in the regression. Therefore, the difference between the 
coefficients  ?̂? obtained by estimating equation 4 and the estimator ?̂?2 can be 
interpreted as the fraction of the elasticity associated to a single mediating factor.  
Observe however, that this is true only if a mediating variable included in the 
vector 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 is not correlated with the error term. Conversely, if the mediating variable 
is positively (negatively) correlated with other unobservable factors that influence 
offspring’s wealth, the coefficient ?̂?2 is upward (downward) biased and the channel 
of influence is overestimated (underestimated). Moreover, since I am using imputed 
wealth for the first generation, the correlation between parental wealth and a single 
mediating factor may be underestimated if the set of socio-economic characteristics 
used to predict parental wealth are not able to completely capture some 
characteristics of individuals which are correlated to wealth of both generations. 
For instance, if an unobservable (for instance propensity to save) which is positively 
correlated to wealth of the two generations and to a single mediating factor included 
in the vector 𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  (for instance savings) is not totally captured by auxiliary variables 
used to impute parental wealth (i.e. the imputed parental wealth is less correlated to 
the vector 𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  in equation 11 than actual parental wealth), then I am likely to 
underestimate the mediating role of that intergenerational channel. On the contrary, 
the role of a single mediating factors may be also underestimated if yearly measures 
                                               
23 Most of the studies which decompose the IWE into different components use this kind of 
approach. 
73 
 
included in the vector 𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  are not able to capture permanent differences in economic 
performances in the labour market or if saving preferences and attitude toward risk 
change over the lifecycle. 
With all this in mind, I try to analyse the mediating factors behind the 
intergenerational wealth correlation.  The mediating role of abilities and human 
capital accumulation is captured indirectly by evaluating the difference between the 
elasticity obtained by estimating equation 4 (i.e. the baseline elasticity obtained 
without controlling for any mediating variable) and that obtained when labour 
income and three categories of expected future income (e.g. higher future real 
income, lower future real income, or no expected variations) are included as 
controls.  
Educational attainments may also have a direct influence on offspring’s wealth 
accumulation, since more educated individuals may be able to obtain higher returns 
on their investment or may have higher saving rates than the rest of the population. 
Thus, the direct influence of human capital on offspring’s wealth is evaluated by 
adding a three categories educational dummy as a further control24.  
Regarding the mediating role of the intergenerational correlation in the rate of 
return on investments and savings, I control for annual savings, three categories of 
financial risk propensity and the amount of overall income that offspring would 
save against unexpected events, such as increased uncertainty over future earnings 
or unexpected expenses (for instance, for health problems or other emergencies). 
These variables should, at least partially, capture intergenerational wealth 
correlations trough saving propensity and the return on investments. 
Lastly, to test the mediating role of bequests and inter-vivos transfers, I can use 
two different approaches. Firstly, I can consider the residual wealth elasticity as an 
upper bound of the fraction of the elasticity related to direct intergenerational 
transfers. However, in this case, the unexplained elasticity may also capture the 
influence of other unobservable factors such as altruism, financial literacy, 
transitory shocks or additional parental characteristics. Alternatively, I can analyse 
                                               
24 Results are quite similar if more than 3 categories of educational level are included in the 
regression 
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the mediating role of inheritance by considering only estate wealth which can be 
divided in directly accumulated wealth and inherited wealth so that I can obtain 
estimates of IWE either including or excluding inherited estate wealth as a further 
control.   
Descriptive statistics for all covariates taken from the waves of 2010 and 2012 
and included in the equation 11 are reported in table 2.11.  
Table 2.11: Second stage covariates: descriptive statistics.  
  
Income 23270.010 
 (15750.981) 
  
Saving 7520.804 
 (14908.786) 
  
Precautionary Saving 51698.880 
 (114528.884) 
  
Expected future real income.  
Lower than current 0.632 
No expected variations 0.117 
Higher than current 0.249 
  
Educational Level:  
Less than Upper Secondary 0.400 
Upper Secondary 0.576 
University Degree 0.024 
  
Risk Propensity:  
High 0.174 
Medium 0.361 
Low 0.465 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Mean values, standard deviations in parenthesis. All economic variables are deflated 
by using the consumer price index.                 
Unsurprisingly, most of sample offspring in the sample have a medium level of 
education (upper secondary) and a low level of financial risk propensity. For 
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instance, the share of total households which prefer investments that offer very high 
returns, but with a higher risk of losing part of the capital, is less than 20 percent. 
Regarding saving preferences, the amount of annual savings is on average about 
32% of personal annual income and the amount of cumulate resources that offspring 
would save against unexpected events such as increased uncertainty over future 
earnings or unexpected expenses is about 7 times the amount of annual savings. 
Table 2.12 reports the elasticity obtained by estimating the equation 4 (column 1) 
and lower estimates obtained controlling for income and expected future income 
(column 2); income, three categories of expected future income and educational 
attainments (column 3); offspring’s preferences (column 4); all available mediating 
variables (column 5).  
Table 2.12: IWE, mediating variables 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Log Net Wealth 0.451*** 0.254*** 0.201*** 0.367*** 0.203*** 
 [0.060] [0.059] [0.059] [0.061] [0.057] 
      
Income  0.738*** 0.677***  0.671*** 
  [0.076] [0.071]  [0.082] 
      
Precautionary    0.196*** 0.107* 
    [0.066] [0.059] 
      
Savings    0.330*** -0.034 
    [0.065] [0.059] 
      
Expected future income  Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Education   Yes  Yes 
      
Risk Propensity    Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.124 0.249 0.263 0.176 0.268 
Obs. 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Monetary controls are 
standardized. All regressions include, offspring’s age, age squared and the ratio between personal income and total household 
income as further controls. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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As previously noted, the baseline estimated elasticity is 0.451. The reduction 
associated to the inclusion of annual income and expected future income is large 
since the estimated elasticity falls to 0.254. However, this reduction may be 
downward biased as annual economic measures are likely to be affected by 
measurement errors. In any case, the result is consistent with the evidence provided 
by Charles and Hurst (2003) for the United States that report a 52 percent reduction 
of the elasticity when actual income of both fathers and offspring are included in 
the regress. Conversely, studies on Scandinavian countries which find higher levels 
of wealth mobility across generations, report also a minor role of labour income as 
a mediating factor (Boserup et al, 2013). The influence of parental background on 
economic opportunities of offspring in the labour market may thus account for most 
of cross-country differences in the degree of intergenerational wealth mobility. 
Table 2.13: Mediating Variables 
Mediating Variable Fraction of the elasticity explained 
Preferences 18.6% 
  
Income 43.7% 
  
Income + Education 55.4% 
  
All Together 55.4% 
  
Unexplained Elasticity 44.6% 
   Author's elaboration based on the SHIW.   
The direct association between human capital and wealth is described by 
including educational attainments beside labour income as a further control in 
equation 11. Controlling for both variables increases the difference between the 
coefficients ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 of an additional 11 percent. Therefore, educational 
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attainments may be correlated to offspring’s saving rates and returns on investment 
by capturing, for instance, differences among individuals in financial literacy. 
Controlling for the amount of overall savings, precautionary savings and risk 
propensity reduces the estimated IWE to 0.367. This means, that about 19 percent 
of the overall estimated elasticity may be correlated to the intergenerational 
transmission of preferences (table 2.13) which may influence saving propensity and 
attitudes to risk of both generations.   
Lastly, when all mediating variables are considered together, I obtain a residual 
wealth elasticity of 0.203, which is not significantly different from the one obtained 
controlling only for labour income and education. This seems to exclude the 
presence of a direct association between offspring’s and parental wealth through 
savings and attitudes to risk.  
2.10.1. Intergenerational wealth mobility and inherited estate wealth 
In previous section, I could not directly test the role of bequests and inter-vivos 
transfers by estimating equation 11, since the waves of 2010 and 2012 provide no 
information about the amount of direct total wealth transfers received from parents 
during lifetime. Nevertheless, I can use the unexplained elasticity as an upper bound 
of the mediating role of bequests and inter vivos transfers. In this case, by making 
the strong assumption that the residual elasticity captures no additional 
unobservable influences, bequests and donations in the model seem to reduce the 
IWE by about 45%.  
Alternatively, I can estimate the mediating role of bequests and donations by 
exploiting information on personal inherited estate wealth. Also in this case, I take 
all heads of the households aged 35 to 48 with positive estate wealth such that I can 
re-estimate equation 11 by substituting total net wealth with estate wealth for both 
generations. Thus, I re-estimate equation 11 with or without including inherited 
estate wealth as further control in the vector 𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  to assess the fraction of elasticity 
which is correlated to direct intergenerational transfers. 
Table 2.14 reports the estimated elasticity of offspring’s wealth with or without 
controlling for savings, risk propensity, labour income, educational attainments and 
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inherited estate wealth of the second generation.  The estimate of the influence of 
parental estate wealth on offspring’s through donations or inheritance is lower than 
the one obtained using the unexplained elasticity as a proxy of the role of direct 
intergenerational transfers. In particular, inheritance and bequest seem to explain 
about 30% of the overall IWE. However, when all other control variables are 
included (column 2), the mediating role of inheritance seems to be even lower and 
equal to about 17% of the baseline estimated IWE.  
Table 2.14: Intergenerational Estate Wealth Elasticity: Mediating Variables 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Parental Estate wealth 0.478*** 0.343*** 0.260*** 0.182** 
 [0.070] [0.063] [0.077] [0.071] 
     
Inherited estate wealth  0.304***  0.270*** 
  [0.026]  [0.031] 
     
Income   0.244*** 0.180*** 
   [0.037] [0.039] 
     
Precautionary   0.053 0.026 
   [0.034] [0.029] 
     
Savings   -0.017 0.002 
   [0.035] [0.033] 
     
Expected future income   Yes Yes 
     
Education   Yes Yes 
     
Risk Propensity   Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.064 0.237 0.169 0.299 
Obs. 729 729 729 729 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Monetary controls are 
standardized All regressions include offspring’s age and age squared as controls. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The latter result seems to confirm that the unexplained elasticity should be 
considered as an upward biased estimate of the fraction of intergenerational wealth 
elasticity associated to the mediating role of bequests and donations. Consider 
however, that usually only a small fraction of offspring in their 40s have already 
79 
 
received at least one direct transfer from their parents. For instance, considering a 
sample of offspring aged 35 to 48 with positive levels of estate wealth, only 37 
percent of individuals have inherited some estate wealth (table 2.15). Moreover, 
inherited wealth is more dispersed on average, than total net wealth. This means 
that even though the elasticity of wealth with respect to direct intergenerational 
transfers is not so high, receiving or not a bequest or a donation is likely to be 
associated to the probability of ending up in one of the top quintiles of the wealth 
distribution. 
Table 2.15: Estate wealth: Descriptive Statistics 
Estate Wealth 
220329.12 
[232118.24] 
  
Inherited Estate Wealth 
204441.44 
[202503.84] 
  
Percentage of individuals with positive inherited wealth 37.3% 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW 
 
For instance, figure 2.2 shows that about 27 percent of individuals that received 
at least one estate wealth direct transfer from parents ends up in the top quintile of 
the estate wealth distribution (more than 50 percent in the top two quintiles) and 
only about 15 percent in the lower. Conversely, reaching the highest quintile of the 
wealth distribution without receiving donations or inheritances is far more difficult: 
only about 15.5 percent of individuals who do not receive any direct 
intergenerational transfers are likely to reach the highest quintile of the wealth 
distribution. Observe however that, within the sample, many individuals are likely 
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to have at least one parent still in life. This means that they have not received yet 
the overall amount of intergenerational transfers since they are aged around 40 
years old. Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for the number of parents in 
life since the SHIW does not provide this kind of information.  
 Figure 2.2: Probability of ending in a specific quintile of the estate wealth   
distribution by having received or not some inherited estate wealth.  
 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW 
2.11. Concluding remarks 
This chapter provided a first estimate of the intergenerational wealth elasticity 
and rank-rank slope in Italy using data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). To overcome the lack of information on 
parental wealth, the two-sample two-stage least squares methodology has been used 
by selecting a sample of offspring that report some socio-economic information 
about their actual parents and an independent sample of pseudo-parents in their 40s 
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The resulted intergenerational wealth elasticity of 0.451 and rank-rank slope of 
0.349 revealed that Italy, as well as the United States and Sweden, is a country with 
a lower degree of wealth mobility across generations than other Scandinavian 
countries or France.  Moreover, the degree of wealth mobility in Italy appeared to 
be particularly low at the top and at the bottom of the wealth distribution and in the 
southern part of the country where estimated elasticity resulted to be 0.621. 
To test the pattern of the intergenerational wealth correlation over the children’s 
lifecycle, the intergenerational wealth elasticity and the rank-rank slope are re-
estimated by using three different samples of offspring by age. Results confirmed 
previous evidence that showed a U-shaped pattern of the wealth correlation as a 
function of offspring’s age with higher intergenerational wealth correlations if 
offspring are taken when they are at the beginning of their adulthood or in their 40s.  
This is the reason why, unlike estimates of mobility which use income or earnings 
as a measure of economic status, estimates obtained by selecting young offspring 
seems not to be downward biased. However, further evidence is needed to assess 
the degree of intergenerational wealth mobility if offspring are selected when they 
are retired. 
The decomposition of the intergenerational association into different mediating 
mechanisms showed that permanent labour income of the second generation, 
among other mediating factors such as preferences and bequests or inter-vivos 
transfers, seems to be associated with most of the overall wealth association across 
generations. More specifically, while the intergenerational wealth elasticity became 
43.7 percent lower when labour income of offspring is included as a control, a 
smaller fraction of the wealth association seemed to be related to direct 
intergenerational transfers such as bequests or donations. This evidence suggest that 
parental background is likely to be strongly associated to economic opportunities 
of children once they enter the labour market. 
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Appendix A 
 Table 2.16: Two sample descriptive statistics 
 Pseudo-Parents Parents described by Offspring 
Father's age 46.825 48.018 
 (4.230) (3.837) 
   
Mother's age 43.435 44.666 
 (4.811) (4.175) 
   
Father's educational level:   
None 0.017 0.051 
Elementary 0.308 0.407 
Lower secondary 0.314 0.309 
Upper secondary 0.281 0.185 
University degree 0.080 0.048 
   
Mother's educational level:   
None 0.024 0.059 
Elementary 0.368 0.463 
Lower secondary 0.313 0.301 
Upper secondary 0.229 0.149 
University degree 0.066 0.028 
   
Father's qualification:   
Production worker 0.357 0.466 
Teacher or clerical worker 0.263 0.190 
Junior manager 0.099 0.052 
Manager 0.035 0.021 
Self-Employed 0.201 0.218 
   
Mother's qualification:   
Not employed 0.588 0.527 
Production worker 0.129 0.195 
Teacher or clerical worker 0.173 0.140 
Manager or junior manager 0.021 0.019 
Self-Employed/member of the arts 0.090 0.120 
   
Region of residence:   
Piemonte 0.102 0.097 
Lombardia 0.195 0.118 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.018 0.076 
Veneto 0.063 0.074 
Friuli-Venezia 0.024 0.016 
Liguria 0.034 0.038 
Emilia-Romagna 0.057 0.063 
Toscana 0.062 0.057 
Umbria 0.012 0.016 
Marche 0.016 0.024 
Lazio 0.115 0.104 
Abruzzo 0.015 0.017 
Molise 0.004 0.009 
Campania 0.065 0.079 
Puglia 0.076 0.073 
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Basilicata 0.019 0.030 
Calabria 0.031 0.040 
Sicilia 0.067 0.042 
Sardegna 0.025 0.030 
   Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. 
    Table 2.17: First Stage Auxiliary variables and Post-Estimation Statistics 
 Net Wealth (Log) Net Wealth 
Father's education 
(5 Cat.) 
Yes Yes 
   
Mother's education 
(5 Cat.) 
Yes Yes 
   
Father's qualification 
(6 Cat.) 
Yes Yes 
   
Mother's qualification 
(5 Cat.) 
Yes Yes 
   
Region of Residence 
(19 Cat.) 
Yes Yes 
   
Father’s age polynomial Yes Yes 
   
Mother’s age polynomial Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.278 0.252 
F-statistic 18.02 16.56 
Obs. 2007 2062 
      Author's elaboration based on the SHIW 
Table 2.18: IWE using different sets of auxiliary variables in the first stage 
 IWE First-stage R2 
All aux. variables 0.451*** 0.278 
 [0.062]  
   
Excluding fathers’ educational level 0.472*** 0.257 
 [0.064]  
   
Excluding mothers’ educational level 0.476*** 0.254 
 [0.062]  
   
Excluding fathers’ occupational status  0.561*** 0.167 
 [0.075]  
   
Excluding mothers’ occupational status 0.514*** 0.237 
 [0.066]  
   
Excluding region of residence of parents 0.518*** 0.211 
 [0.069]  
   
Excluding fathers’ age polynomial  0.470*** 0.256 
 [0.063]  
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Excluding mothers’ age polynomial  0.477*** 0.259 
 [0.065]  
Obs. 1076  
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
Table 2.19: Rank to rank slopes using different sets of auxiliary variables in the first 
stage 
 R2R First-stage R2 
All aux. variables 0.349*** 0.252 
 [0.030]  
   
Excluding fathers’ educational level 0.350*** 0.231 
 [0.028]  
   
Excluding mothers’ educational level 0.332*** 0.226 
 [0.030]  
   
Excluding fathers’ occupational status  0.322*** 0.159 
 [0.027]  
   
Excluding mothers’ occupational status 0.340*** 0.212 
 [0.029]  
   
Excluding region of residence of parents 0.334*** 0.209 
 [0.027]  
   
Excluding fathers’ age polynomial  0.345*** 0.230 
 [0.028]  
   
Excluding mothers’ age polynomial  0.349*** 0.233 
 [0.028]  
Obs. 1158  
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Both offspring’s wealth 
and parental wealth is percentile ranked within offspring’s age. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 2.20: Estimated Rank-Rank slope by offspring’s area of residence.    
Robustness check 
 [North/Centre] [South/Islands] 
Parental Net Wealth 0.285*** 0.404*** 
 [0.036] [0.047] 
   
Area of birth≠Area of residence -3.74 4.63 
 [2.54] [7.42] 
R-squared 0.084 0.163 
Obs. 777 381 
Author's elaboration based on the SHIW. Bootstrapped standard errors (reps 100) in parentheses. Both offspring’s wealth 
and parental wealth are percentile ranked by offspring and parents birth cohort. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B 
Table 2.21: Components of net wealth 
Variable Description 
  
Real Assets: 
 
AR1 Real Estate: housing, land other buildings 
  
AR2 Businesses 
  
AR3 Valuables   
  
Financial Assets: 
 
AF1 Deposits, CDs, repos, postal saving certificates 
  
AF2 Government Securities 
  
AF3 
Other Securities: bonds, mutual funds, equity, shares in 
private limited companies and partnerships, foreign 
securities, loans to cooperatives 
  
AF4 Credit due from other households   
  
Financial Liabilities: 
 
PF1 Liabilities to banks and financial companies25 
  
PF3 Liabilities to other households 
Source: Bank of Italy’s SHIW. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 Short term debts, overdraft on credit cards and current accounts and trade of business debts 
are not included 
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 Chapter 3: Intergenerational Earnings Inequality in Italy: New 
Evidences and Main Mechanisms26 
 
Abstract  
This chapter provides new and detailed estimates of intergenerational earnings 
inequality in Italy and sheds light on mechanisms behind the association of gross 
and net earnings between fathers and sons.  
Being not available panel data following subsequent generations in Italy, we 
make use of a recently built dataset that merges information provided by IT-SILC 
2005 (i.e., the Italian component of EU-SILC 2005) with detailed information about 
the whole working life of those interviewed in IT-SILC recorded in the 
administrative archives managed by the Italian National Social Security Institute 
(INPS). This dataset allows us to rely on the two-sample two-stage least squares 
method (TSTSLS) to predict father earnings and, then, compute point in time 
intergenerational elasticities (IGE) and imputed rank-rank slopes. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the dataset allow us to extend point in time estimates considering, 
for both sons and “pseudo-fathers”, average earnings in a 5-year period and 
observing sons at various ages, thus assessing the robustness of our estimates to 
attenuation and life cycle biases.  
Confirming previous evidence (Mocetti 2007; Piraino 2007), we find that Italy 
is characterized by a relatively high earnings inequality in cross country comparison 
– the size of the estimated β is usually over 0.40 – and the size of the 
intergenerational association increases when older sons and multi-annual averages 
are considered.  
We also investigate mechanisms behind this association both: i) including a set 
of possible mediating factors of the parental influence (e.g., sons’ education, 
occupation, labour market experience) among the control variables when regressing 
sons’ earnings on fathers’ earnings and ii) following the sequential decomposition 
approach suggested by Blanden et al. (2007). Results show that a limited share of 
the intergenerational association is attributable to sons’ educational and 
occupational attainment, while the largest part of the association is mediated by 
sons’ employability along the career, i.e., by their effective experience since the 
entry in the labour market. 
                                               
26 This chapter is part of a research project with Michele Raitano (Sapienza University of Rome) 
and Teresa Barbieri (Ph.D candidate in Economics and Social Sciences at Sapienza University of 
Rome).  
87 
 
Introduction 
In the last few decades, a growing body of international literature has focused on 
intergenerational transmission of social and economic advantages (and 
disadvantages). Economists have focused their attention on measuring the degree 
of income persistence across two generations and, more specifically, on the 
estimation of the intergenerational elasticity coefficient β that captures how much 
of the income difference between two parents still is preserved between their 
children (see Blanden, 2013). Due to constraints that effect women participation in 
the labour market, literature on intergenerational mobility usually focuses on the 
association between fathers and sons’ earnings.  
Even if reliable estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) are 
available only for few nations, a generally accepted ranking has emerged from 
cross-country empirical studies on economic mobility as concerns developed 
countries (Solon, 2002; Corak, 2013; D'Addio, 2007; Bjorklund & Jantti, 2009; 
Blanden, 2013): Nordic European countries emerge as the most mobile, while the 
US, the UK and Southern European countries are reported to be the most unequal. 
According to the few available estimates (Mocetti, 2007, Piraino, 2007), Italy 
belongs to the low-mobility group.  
Actually, due to the unavailability of datasets jointly recording information on 
children and parents’ earnings or income, Italy has received a limited attention in 
the intergenerational mobility literature. Nonetheless, the IGE in Italy has been 
estimated in recent years by means of the two-sample two-stage least squares 
(TSTSLS) method, which allows researchers to overcome the lack of data regarding 
actual fathers’ incomes (Mocetti 2007; Piraino, 2007). More specifically, when long 
panel data recording income information for both generations of parents and 
children observed at middle ages are not available, the TSTSLS empirical approach 
exploits two independent samples of sons and pseudo-fathers and some sons-
reported retrospective information about fathers to obtain a prediction of fathers’ 
earnings in the first stage and the IGE in the second. Mocetti (2007) and Piraino 
(2007), followed this approach by using various cross-sections of the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), computed point in time 
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measures (i.e. concerning a single year) of intergenerational net earnings elasticity. 
They obtained estimated values amounting, respectively, to 0.50 and 0.44.  
An alternative measure of mobility, i.e. the rank-rank slope, has recently proved 
to be more robust across samples and specifications (Dahl & Delaire 2008; Chetty 
et al. 2014) and with respect to both life-cycle and attenuation bias (Gregg et al. 
2014) than the IGE27. However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have 
estimated rank-rank slopes for Italy so far. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide new estimates of the earnings 
mobility in Italy by means of a proper dataset, that, compared to the SHIW, allows 
us to observe sons’ and pseudo-fathers’ earnings for more than one-year. To this 
aim, we use the AD-SILC dataset, that has been developed merging information 
provided in IT-SILC (2005) – where a retrospective section on parental 
characteristics is recorded – with information on the whole working history since 
the entry in the labour market of all individuals interviewed in IT-SILC provided 
by the administrative archives managed by the Italian National Social Security 
Institute (INPS). Thus, we can exploit the longitudinal nature of these data to apply 
the TSTSLS procedure, computing multi-year earnings values for both generations. 
INPS data record earnings gross of taxes and contribution paid by the worker. This 
means that we can compute indexes of intergenerational inequality of gross 
earnings, thus computing the size of income persistence produced by the labour 
market, before the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers. In order to compare 
our results with those provided by Mocetti (2007) and Piraino (2007), who focused 
on net earnings, we also reconstructed net earnings for both generations to re-
estimate the intergenerational elasticity.  
However, the aim of this chapter does not limit to compute summary measures 
of intergenerational inequality (as the IGE or the rank-rank slope). Indeed, we also 
                                               
27 More specifically, intergenerational elasticity capture both the re-ranking across generations 
and the differences in the amount of inequality within each generation (due to changes in income 
distribution across generations). Thus, the IGE is very sensitive to changes in inequality and it may 
not capture changes in positional income mobility only, but also the evolution of cross-sectional 
earnings inequality (Lefranc, 2011).  This may be problematic when we want to compare the degree 
of intergenerational mobility across countries with different level of cross-sectional inequality.  
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aim at assessing which are the main mechanisms behind the correlation between 
parents’ and children’ earnings. In particular, we aim at analysing whether the bulk 
of intergenerational inequality is explained by educational and occupational 
attainments of children coming from different backgrounds or a significant 
association between parents’ and children’ earnings emerges also controlling for 
these children’s outcomes.  
To this end, we first compare our baseline results adding in our estimates of the 
link between fathers’ and sons’ earnings further variables that can mediate the 
relationship between fathers’ circumstances and sons’ earnings (e.g. sons’ 
educational attainments, contractual arrangement and experience in the labour 
market).  
 Moreover, we apply a sequential decomposition approach (Blanden et al. 2007; 
Hirvonen, 2010; Buchner at al., 2012; Macmillan, 2013; Blanden et al, 2014) to 
disentangle the share of the IGE explained by various children’s characteristics that 
might be affected by parental circumstances. According to the Becker and Tomes 
theoretical framework (1979 and 1986), when capitals markets are not perfect and 
public investment in education does not fully compensate for them, investment in 
children human capital by parents coming from disadvantaged background are 
limited, since parents face liquidity constraints. Literature on intergenerational 
mobility based on this theoretical framework recognizes education as the main 
transmission mechanism of persistence across generations: children coming from a 
more disadvantaged background receive a lower level of investments education 
and, consequently, later in life they will have less job opportunity and lower 
earnings.  
 However, this “human capital view” has been challenged by some scholars that 
recognize the importance of a “direct” effect of family background on earnings, not 
mediated by “formal” educational attainments. (e.g., Breen & Goldthorpe, 2001; 
Goldthorpe & Jackson, 2008; Franzini & Raitano, 2009; Franzini et al, 2013; 
Hudson and Sessions 2011, Raitano & Vona, 2015). 
The decomposition approach, as mentioned, measures to which extent the IGE 
is explained by sons’ characteristics (e.g. education or occupation). The explained 
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part is measured accounting for both the relationship between parent’s earnings and 
children’s characteristics and the return to those characteristics in the labour market. 
Thus, the intergenerational elasticity can be decomposed in two parts: the indirect 
effect of parental background acting through children’s endowment of different 
characteristics and a residual direct effect not explained by these characteristics.  
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 presents the 
main findings of the empirical literature on intergenerational mobility, focusing on 
the differences between the empirical approaches that have been proposed to tackle 
with the issue of intergenerational inequality when information of parents’ earnings 
are not available. Section 3.2 describes the dataset and the sample selection used to 
run our estimates. Section 3.3 describes the methodology and the empirical strategy 
that we follow in this chapter. Section 3.4 presents results of the TSTSLS estimates 
of the IGE comparing results obtained observing parents and children for different 
time spans. Section 3.5 presents results of the estimates of imputed rank-rank slopes 
comparing again results obtained observing parents and children for different time 
spans. Section 3.6 shows how IGE and rank-rank slopes change when we add some 
children outcomes among the control variables. Section 3.7 shows results of the 
decomposition of the IGE for Italy into different mediating variables that may 
account for the transmission of earnings between parents and children. Section 3.8 
concludes, summarizing our main results. 
3.1. Intergenerational earnings mobility: OLS estimates 
Over the last two decades, economists have broadly analysed to what extent 
economic advantages are transmitted from one generation to the next28. The ideal 
way to evaluate the degree of intergenerational economic mobility is to use 
permanent earnings (or permanent incomes, when also information on labour 
incomes are not available) as a measure of economic welfare of individuals and to 
estimate the following equation:    
 
                                               
28 For a review of the studies on intergenerational earnings mobility, see Solon (1999), Black 
and Deveroux (2010) and Blanden (2013). 
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 𝑦𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑦𝑖
𝑓
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖
𝑠 and  𝑦𝑖
𝑓
 are respectively the logarithm of permanent sons’ and fathers’ 
earnings and 𝛽 is the IGE29. According to this measure of economic association 
between generations, a country is completely mobile when the estimated 𝛽 equals 
0, while the higher the earnings elasticity is, the lower the degree of economic 
mobility across generations will be.  
Unfortunately, several methodological issues arise when trying to estimate 
equation 1. Firstly, also the few datasets covering two generations usually report 
short-term rather than permanent measures of earnings. This implies that, under 
classical measurement errors assumptions, estimated elasticities obtained using 
yearly instead of permanent fathers’ earnings are likely to be downward biased due 
to the so-called attenuation bias (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). A usual way to 
reduce this kind of bias is to average fathers’ earnings over a period as large as 
possible. The greater the number of years available when averaging fathers’ 
earnings is, the closer to the true 𝛽 the estimated IGE will be (Mazumder, 2005a).  
Secondly, the lack of permanent measures of earnings might cause the so-called 
lifecycle bias if too young children are considered. More specifically, estimated 
elasticities are influenced by the amount of earnings dispersion which tends to 
become higher as individuals get older, since earnings profiles are steeper for those 
with higher long-run earnings. Therefore, Haider and Solon (2006) suggest 
choosing both parents and children at median age to minimise the lifecycle bias 
when permanent measures of earnings are not available.  
Table 3.1 summarizes estimated earnings elasticities from different empirical 
studies on 8 developed countries which use a 4/5 year-time average of parental 
earnings on the right-hand side of equation 1. Reported elasticities identify the 
Unites States as the less mobile society among those considered, with an estimated 
                                               
29 Usually the IGE is computed by considering only fathers and sons in order not to have a 
selection bias due to the lower women participation in the labour market.  
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𝛽 of 0.54. Conversely, Denmark is reported to be the most mobile country with an 
estimated earnings elasticity of 0.14. 
Table 3.1: Intergenerational earnings elasticity: OLS estimates (4/5yrs averaged 
fathers’earnings) 
Country Source  Earnings Elasticty 
U.S. Zimmerman (1992)  0.54 
Norway Nilsen et al. (2012)  0.27 (on average) 
Germany Vogel (2008)  0.25 
Sweden Björklund & Chadwick (2003)  0.24 
Canada Corak & Heisz (1999)  0.23 
Finland Pekkarinen et al. (2009)  0.23-0.30 
Denmark Hussain et al. (2008)  0.14 
 
 
 
As described in chapter 1, information about parents’ earnings and/or income 
are usually absent in many developed countries and in most of less developed 
countries. For this reason, it is extremely hard to rank countries in terms of 
economic mobility by considering only those for which an OLS estimate on 
effective fathers’ and sons’ incomes is available. A way to overcome this issue was 
first proposed by Björklund and Jӓntti (1997) that make use of the two-sample 
instrumental variable methodology (TSIV), originally described by Angrist and 
Krueger (1992) and Arellano and Meghir (1992), to estimate intergenerational 
elasticities in Sweden and the United States. This approach exploits two 
independent samples and some information about some socio-economic 
characteristics of actual parents (usually of the father) reported by their children 
(usually the sons) to predict earnings of the older generation.  
As time goes by, the TSTSLS method becomes gradually more used because 
computationally more convenient and asymptotically more efficient than the TSIV 
(Inoue and Solon, 2010). As described in the previous chapters, the TSTSLS 
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method is implemented by exploiting a sample of adult sons, who report some 
socio-economic characteristics of their actual fathers, and an independent sample 
of individuals, different from the actual fathers observed during the childhood of 
the adult sons, to obtain intergenerational elasticities in a two-stage approach.  
Consider however, that the number of retrospective variables available to impute 
fathers’ earnings are likely to influence the estimated IGE. In particular, as 0 ≤ R2 
≤ 1, the variance of imputed fathers’ earnings is less than or equal to the variance 
of actual fathers’ earnings and  ?̂?𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 when, in the first stage regression, 
the R2 =1. This means that the higher the number of good auxiliary variables is, the 
higher the explained variance of pseudo-fathers’ earnings will be and the lower the 
bias of the TSTSLS estimator is expected to be. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the estimated elasticity converges in probability to the following expression: 
 
𝛽 ≅ 𝜌𝑠𝑓
𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑑𝑓
                                                       (2) 
 
where 𝜌𝑠𝑓  is the correlation between sons’ and fathers’ earnings and 𝑠𝑑𝑠  and  𝑠𝑑𝑓 
are the two standard deviations.  
3.2. Data and sample selection 
Our estimates of intergenerational earnings mobility are obtained by relying on 
AD-SILC, a very rich panel dataset built merging the 2005 wave of the Italian 
sample of the Survey on Income and Living Condition (IT-SILC) conducted by 
Istat (the National Italian Statistical Institute) with information collected from 
administrative archives managed by the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) that 
cover individual earnings histories from the moment they enter the labour market 
up to the end of 2013. The administrative archives provide records of every job 
relationship that individuals experienced during the year such as the duration 
(measured in weeks), the fund where the worker pays contributions (allowing us to 
distinguish private and public employees and the various groups of self-employed), 
gross earnings (including personal income taxes and pension contributions paid by 
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the worker). Furthermore, we can distinguish weeks spent working from weeks 
spent receiving maternity, sickness and CIG allowances or unemployment benefits. 
The panel structure of our data allows us to exactly measure the time of entry in the 
labour market and the effective labour market experience since the entry. Note that 
administrative archives record information on all types of workers in Italy, thus they 
are free from attrition; furthermore, earnings measured in administrative archives 
are less affected by measurement errors than survey data.  
As in most of studies on intergenerational mobility we analyse the relationship 
between parents and children focusing on fathers and sons. In order to carry out our 
empirical strategy, the IT-SILC 2005 survey contains a specific section about 
intergenerational mobility and thus, information about fathers’ characteristics when 
sons were aged around 14, e.g. father’s educational attainments, occupations and 
activity status. The 2005 wave of IT-SILC has then been merged with the INPS 
archives in order to obtain retrospective information on fathers through the IT-SILC 
and sons’ earnings from the administrative archives.  
We select two subsamples of sons and pseudo-fathers according to the following 
rules. We consider sons born in the period 1970-1974 and follow these individuals 
since they are aged 35 up to age 39. Thus, according to their birth year, sons are 
followed in the period 2005-2013 and earnings since age 35 to age 39 are averaged. 
Pseudo-fathers are selected among those individuals observed in the period 1980-
1988 and aged between 40 and 44 in INPS archives (and their earnings over the 
period are also averaged): thus we consider pseud-fathers born in the period 1940-
1944. The two generations are thus observed at middle ages according to the 
selection rules proposed by Haider and Solon (2006) to minimize the amount of 
lifecycle bias.  
Our main variable of interest, annual gross earnings, includes both employment 
and self-employment labour income and is considered in real terms (it has been 
deflated according to the 2012 Consumer Price Index). Thus, considering gross 
incomes, we are able to first evaluate the extent of intergenerational mobility in the 
labour market before the effect of taxes and transfers tooks place. Then, in order to 
compare our results to previous estimates of the IGE for Italy (Piraino, 2007; 
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Mocetti, 2007), we reconstruct net earnings and estimate intergenerational mobility 
measures after the redistributive intervention on earnings exerted by the State 
through social contributions and income taxes30.  
Descriptive statistics presented in table 3.2 show that the two final samples count 
1445 sons and 2742 pseudo-fathers. Gross earnings are slightly more dispersed in 
the sample of sons than in the sample of pseudo-fathers. As expected, income 
taxation reduces earnings dispersion in both generations. 
Table 3.2: Two-Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Sons Pseudo-Fathers 
Age (Mean) 38.80 41.97 
 (0.69) (0.44) 
   
Log Gross Earnings (Mean) 10.00 9.90 
 (0.66) (0.49) 
   
Log Net Earnings (Mean) 9.65 9.63 
 (0.59) (0.46) 
   
Observations 1445 2742 
Author's elaboration based on the AD_SILC dataset.  
Standard deviations in parenthesis. All economic variables are deflated by using the 2012 consumer price index 
A first way to describe the extent of intergenerational mobility in Italy is to present 
sons’ probabilities of ending up in a specific quintile of the earnings distribution 
given the quintile of their fathers’ (figure 3.1). This kind of descriptive analysis may 
be also useful to evaluate the pattern of mobility along the distribution, as previous 
                                               
30 We first subtract employee and self-employed mandatory social contributions and then apply 
to all individuals tax rules (i.e. tax rates and related deductions).  
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literature reports higher levels of intergenerational economic correlation at the top 
of the earnings’ distribution (see Björklund et al. 2010).  
Figure 3.1 shows that for most gross earnings quintiles, sons are more likely to 
ends up in the same quintile as their fathers (diagonal probabilities are all greater 
than 20 percent expect the third quintile31).  
Figure 3.1: Probability of ending up in a specific quintile of the gross earnings 
distribution given the quantile of their fathers’ 
 
Author's elaboration based on the AD_SILC dataset. 
The degree of persistence of earnings across generations is particularly high at 
the top and at the bottom of the distribution: 31 percent of sons whose pseudo-
fathers were collocated in the highest quintile of the distribution remains in the same 
                                               
31 We do not report also mobility matrix for net earnings since results are the same, as taxation 
does not re-rank individuals.  
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quintile and more than 50 percent in one of the highest two quintiles. Conversely, 
only about 10 percent of sons from the best economic background end up in the 
worst quintile. The degree of persistence is also high at the bottom-end of the 
earnings distribution: about 52 percent of sons coming from the lowest quintile of 
the fathers’ earnings distribution remains in one the bottom two quintiles. 
3.3. Empirical strategy  
As in previous studies on intergenerational economic mobility in Italy, we 
exploit the TSTSLS method to obtain measures of intergenerational associations 
for both gross and net annual earnings. We perform the method by exploiting a set 
of fathers’ socio-economic characteristics reported by sons that can be used to 
predict their fathers’ earnings. More formally, in the first stage we estimate the 
following equation by exploiting the sample of pseudo-fathers: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
= 𝛼 + 𝜃1 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑓
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                                               (3) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
 is is the logarithm of pseudo-fathers’ earnings, 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑓
 is the vector of socio-
economic characteristics of pseudo-fathers and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the usual disturbance. The set 
of auxiliary variables contained in 𝑍𝑖
𝑝𝑓
 includes 4 educational categories (primary 
or lower, lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary degree), 27 occupational 
categories (according to the 2 digits ISCO-88 classification), 20 dummies on the 
region of residence32 and a dummy for self-employment.  
Then, we obtain the IGE in the second stage, by regressing the logarithm of sons’ 
earnings on that of pseudo-fathers’: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̂?𝑖
𝐹 + µ𝐵𝑖
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                         (4) 
 
                                               
32 We link sons’ region of birth to parents’ region of residence to avoid biases related to a possible 
mobility across regions of children during their adult age. 
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where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑆  is the logarithm of sons’ earnings, ?̂?𝑖
𝐹 = 𝜃1 𝑍𝑖
𝐹 is the prediction of the 
logarithm of fathers’, 𝐵𝑖
𝑠 is year of birth of the son and 𝛽 is the IGE. 
Even though we are exploiting an instrumental variable approach based on two 
independent samples, we do not aim to identify the causal effect of fathers’ earnings 
on sons’ earnings. Our goal is to merely predict the former in the best possible way. 
This is the reason why we do not require the set of auxiliary variables - used to 
predict fathers’ earnings in the first stage - to satisfy any exclusion restriction. 
However, we are not able to obtain a perfect prediction of fathers’ lifetime earnings 
by using the set of socio-economic characteristics at our disposal. This is why a 
TSTSLS estimator could be affected by three different kind of potential biases 
compared to the OLS estimator obtained by using fathers’ earnings averaged over 
a multi-year period (see chapter 2 for a more formal description).  
Firstly, an attenuation bias deriving from the fact that we are using an imputed 
value instead of an actual value as a regressor. We are thus introducing 
measurement error.  
Secondly, if socio-economic characteristics of fathers are positively correlated 
with the error term in equation 4 (if auxiliary variables are not exogenous), we are 
introducing an upward bias in our estimates as the predicted variance of the earnings 
of the first generation is lower than actual variance. 
A further source of potential bias can derive from the fact that there could be 
other unobservables included in 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 (e.g. soft skills, social networks, cultural 
factors, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities) not totally captured by the set of 
auxiliary variables used in the first stage. In this case, estimates of earnings mobility 
could be upward biased (downward biased) if these unobservables are negatively 
(positively) correlated across generations33. 
Generally speaking, the R2 of the first stage regression may be considered as a 
good measure of the fraction of the variance of pseudo-fathers’ earnings predicted 
from auxiliary variables. Unfortunately, empirical works that use the TSTSLS 
approach are often not able to use permanent or, at least, time-averaged earnings as 
                                               
33 See Olivetti and Paserman (2015) for a more detailed and formalised discussion of the different 
potential sources of bias deriving from imputing fathers’ earnings.  
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a dependent variable in the first stage. This means that, in the first-stage regression, 
the estimated R2 is influenced by different factors. More formally, at any point of 
time, earnings of pseudo-father 𝑖 may be expressed according to the following 
expression: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
= 𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑓
+ 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡                                                 (5) 
 
where  𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓
 and 𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑓
 are respectively yearly and averaged pseudo-fathers’ earnings,  
𝜑𝑖,𝑡  are transitory individual shocks (or measurement errors) and  𝜔𝑡 are aggregate 
transitory shocks. This means that, by definition: 
 
         𝜎2(𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓) > 𝜎2(𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑓)                                                    (6)                                                                                                
  
        𝑅2(𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑓) < 𝑅2(𝑌𝑖
𝑝𝑓)                                                    (7)                                                           
 
where 𝜎2(𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑓 ) and 𝜎2(𝑌𝑖
𝑓)   are the two variances and 𝑅2(𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑓 )  and  𝑅2(𝑌𝑖
𝑓) are 
the proportion of the two variances that is predictable from the set of auxiliary 
variables in the first stage. According to this framework, it is plausible to say that 
𝑅2 in the first stage depends on three factors: 1. The number of auxiliary variables 
exploited to predict earnings (and their predictive power); 2. The number of years 
on which pseudo-fathers’ earnings are averaged; 3. The amount of transitory shocks 
occurred to individuals over the period of analysis34.    
In this chapter, we try to partially reduce some of these sources of biases with 
respect to previous evidence for Italy.  To do that we exploit a set of auxiliary 
variables which allow us to explain about 40% of the variance of pseudo-fathers’ 
earnings (about 10% higher than those obtained in the first stage by Piraino, 2007 
and Mocetti, 2007). This means that we are partially reducing unexplained variance 
                                               
34 For a more detailed discussion of the downward bias derived from using yearly instead of 
averaged earnings for the first generation, see Jerrim et al. (2016) 
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due to unobservables included in 𝑣𝑖,𝑡. Our result derives also from the fact that we 
are able to reduce measurement error due to transitory shocks by averaging earnings 
of pseudo-fathers over a 5-year period, in order to get a better prediction of lifetime 
earnings.  
3.4. Estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities 
Estimated IGE for gross earnings is presented in table 3.3. The first column 
reports an estimated IGE of 0.496, obtained when earnings of both pseudo-fathers 
and sons are observed in a 5-year period. Such a result means that a 10 percent 
variation in fathers’ earnings is associated with a 4.96 percent variation in son’s 
earnings. This estimated IGE is slightly higher than that of 0.44 reported by Piraino 
(2007) and close to that of 0.50 reported by Mocetti (2007) using net instead of 
gross incomes.  
However, when we use a single year measure for both the two generations – 
observing fathers and sons, respectively, in 1985 and 2009 only – the estimated IGE 
becomes lower than the ones obtained by Piraino (2007) and Mocetti (2007) which 
used point in time estimates. The lower value obtained in this paper compared to 
previous evidence is probably related to a reduction in the unexplained variance of 
pseudo-fathers’ earnings. On the contrary, the use of time-averages increases our 
estimated elasticity. This means that, although the two generations are taken at 
middle ages as suggested by Haider and Solon (2006), using a single year measure 
of earnings may cause a downward bias in estimated IGE due to both left-hand and 
right-hand side measurement errors. These results are consistent with previous 
evidence which show that both TSTSLS and OLS estimates of intergenerational 
earnings elasticities are likely to be downward biased using point in time measures 
of fathers’ earnings, even when commonly used selection rules for both generations 
are exploited (Gregg et al. 2014, Jerrim et al., 2016).  
The last column of table 3.3 shows that the IGE increases when zero earnings 
observations are not excluded from the analysis, i.e. when individuals that are not 
present in INPS archives in a year in the observed period are considered in the 
estimates considering a zero-earning value for that year. This suggests that sons of 
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poorer fathers are likely to have more unstable careers (i.e. to spend a year without 
earnings) than workers coming from a better background. 
Table 3.3: Association between son’s and father’s gross earnings. Prime age sonsa. 
OLS estimates in the second stageb 
 
Observation span of fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
 5 years-5 years 5 years-1 year 1 year-5 years 1 year-1 year 
5 years-5 years 
Imputing zerosc 
Father’s earnings 0.496*** 0.441*** 0.402*** 0.382*** 0.623*** 
s.e. [0.056] [0.056] [0.054] [0.054] [0.081] 
Obs 1445 1365 1445 1365 1481 
R2 0.059 0.048 0.043 0.040 0.044 
R2 first stage 0.409 0.409 0.404 0.404 0.409 
a when observed in a 5 year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 2009.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross earnings on 
dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage sons’ log annual gross earnings are 
regressed on predicted fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of birth.  c 5-year average of sons’ earnings in age 
class 35-39 are computed assigning a zero value to sons who do not report earnings in administrative archives in a certain 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: elaborations on AD-SILC dataset 
The presence of the life cycle bias is confirmed when we replace the sons’ 
generation by considering a sample of younger sons aged 25-29 born from 1970  
1974 (Table 3.4). In this case, the estimated IGE obtained by measuring over a 5-
year period falls to 0.270 (0.365 when also zero earnings observations are included 
in the analysis).  
Some sensitivity tests are performed to evaluate the robustness of our estimated 
elasticity. First, we check whether the estimated IGE changes if we exclude a single 
predictor from the first stage regression35. More specifically, the TSTSLS estimate 
should be considered upward (downward) biased if auxiliary variables used in the 
first stage have positive (negative) direct effect on sons’ earnings. Results presented 
                                               
35 We perform the Sargan test to evaluate if the full set of instruments used in the first stage in 
uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage regression. The test rejects the null hypothesis, 
which means that at least one instrument is not exogenous. 
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in table A.1 in the appendix show that the estimated elasticity tends to be extremely 
stable if either educational or occupational categories are excluded from the set of 
auxiliary variables exploited as predictors in the first stage. On the contrary it 
becomes higher (lower) if we exclude the dummy for self-employment (region of 
residence). 
Table 3.4: Association between son’s and father’s earnings. Young sonsa. OLS 
estimates in the second stageb 
 Observation span of fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
 5 years-5 years 5 years-1 year 1 year-5 years 1 year-1 year 
5 years-5 years 
Imputing zerosc 
Father’s earnings 0.270*** 0.225*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 0.365*** 
s.e. [0.058] [0.079] [0.057] [0.076] [0.097] 
Obs 1395 1147 1395 1147 1410 
R2 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.022 0.018 
R2 first stage 0.409 0.409 0.404 0.404 0.409 
a When observed in a 5 year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 25-29 in the period 1995-2003. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 1999.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross earnings on 
dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage sons’ log annual gross earnings are 
regressed on predicted fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of birth.  c 5-year average of sons’ earnings in age 
class 25-29 are computed assigning a zero value to sons who do not report earnings in administrative archives in a certain 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: elaborations on AD-SILC dataset    
As mentioned, previous estimates for Italy (Piraino, 2007; Mocetti, 2007) are 
computed on net earnings. In order to better compare our estimates, we derive also 
measures of net earnings for both generations. In table 3.5 we present the IGE 
computed on net earnings. The estimated IGE of 0.428 is obtained when earnings 
of both sons and pseudo-fathers are observed over a 5-year period. This estimated 
IGE is lower than the one previously obtained when using gross earnings. It is 
possible to notice that, with respect to our previous estimates, the R2 for the first 
stage equation – thus, the explained variance of pseudo-fathers’ earnings –  
increases: the same auxiliary variables seem to better predict net earnings than gross 
earnings. Moreover, the income taxation system has reduced more earnings 
dispersion in the sons’ generation than in the first generation. 
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When comparing our estimates using net earnings, we can see that estimated 
IGE now is lower compared to those reported by both Mocetti (2007) and Piraino 
(2007), even if we use earnings of both pseudo-fathers and sons observed in a 5-
year period.  Moreover, when we use a 1-year measure of net earnings for both 
generations, we obtain an even lower estimated IGE with respect to previous 
estimates for Italy (Mocetti, 2007; Piraino, 2007) which use point in time measures. 
As in the case of the estimated IGE obtained using gross earnings, the use of time-
averages increases our estimated IGE. 
Table 3.5: Association between son’s and father’s net earnings. Prime age sonsc. 
OLS estimates in the second stageb 
 Observation span of fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
 5 years-5 years 5 years-1 year 1 year-5 years 1 year-1 year 
5 years-5 years 
Imputing zerosc 
Father’s earnings 0.428*** 0.383*** 0.350*** 0.333*** 0.540*** 
s.e. [0.048] [0.048] [0.049] [0.046] [0.073] 
Obs 1445 1365 1445 1365 1481 
R2 0.056 0.047 0.042 0.040 0.038 
R2 first stage 0.463 0.463 0.472 0.472 0.463 
a when observed in a 5 year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 2009.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual net earnings on 
dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage sons’ log annual net earnings are 
regressed on predicted fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of birth.  c 5-year average of sons’ earnings in age 
class 35-39 are computed assigning a zero value to sons who do not report earnings in administrative archives in a certain 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: elaborations on AD-SILC dataset. 
In any case, comparing estimates of intergenerational elasticity coefficient is not 
a trivial exercise, because differences in estimates must be interpreted considering 
many factors such as the measure of earnings or income used, the sample selection 
and the applied methodology. For example, when the TSTSLS method is applied, 
the set of auxiliary variables used in the first stage to predict fathers’ earnings vary 
across different studies, depending on the availability of retrospective socio-
economic information about fathers reported by sons. In the best-case scenario, a 
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large number of socio-economic characteristics of the father such as his education, 
occupational qualification, sector of activity, geographic area and age (or year of 
birth) are all exploited as predictors; in the worst, estimates are obtained by using 
only one retrospective variable such as in the case of Brazil (see for example Dunn, 
2007). 
Some results from empirical studies estimating earnings elasticities for different 
countries using either the TSIV of the TSTSLS method are presented in table 3.6.   
Table 3.6: Intergenerational earnings elasticity for developed and less developed 
countries: TSTSLS or TSIV estimates 
Country Source Earnings Elasticity 
Ecuador Grawe (2004) 1.13 
Brazil Dunn (2007) 0.69 
Chile Nunez and Miranda (2011) 0.66 
South Africa Piraino (2015) 0.62-0.68 
China Gong et al. (2012) 0.63* 
Peru Grawe (2001) 0.60 
Brazil Ferreira & Veloso (2006) 0.58 
U.S. Björklund and Jӓntii (1997) 0.52 
Italy Mocetti (2007) 0.50 
Pakistan Grawe (2001) 0.46 
Italy Piraino (2007) 0.44 
Nepal Grawe (2001) 0.44 
Spain Cervini-Plà (2015) 0.42 
France Lefranc & Trannoy (2005) 0.40 
South Korea Ueda (2013) 0.35 
Japan Ueda (2013) 0.35 
U.K. Bidisha et al. (2013) 0.33 
Germany Cavaglià (2015) 0.30 
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U.K. Nicoletti and Ermish (2007) 0.29 
Sweden Björklund and Jӓntii (1997) 0.28 
Australia Leigh (2007A) 0.20-0.30 
Taiwan Kan et al. (2015) 0.18* 
* Income elasticity is reported since an estimate of the earnings elasticity is not available for the country. 
Unlike OLS estimates of earnings mobility, which are only available for a small 
number of developed countries, elasticities obtained by means of either the TSTSLS 
or TSIV approach are provided for many developed and less developed countries. 
The latter are reported to be less mobile societies as estimated earnings elasticities 
are basically greater than 0.60. On the contrary, Taiwan, Sweden and Australia, 
among those considered, are countries with high levels of intergenerational mobility 
with estimates IGE below the value of 0.30. If we consider our estimates of the IGE 
of 0.43, when we use net earnings or 0.50 when we use gross earnings, we can 
consider Italy as a medium-mobility country, when compared to both developed 
and less developed countries, and a low-mobility country when restricting the 
analysis to the subsample of developed countries. For instance, IGE estimates in 
other developed countries such as Germany, UK, Sweden, Australia and Japan are 
below the value of 0.40.  It is interesting to compare our estimates with the elasticity 
of another Mediterranean country, Spain (Cervini, 2015), obtained using TSTSLS 
method and gross earnings. According to her results, the IGE for Spain is of 0.42, 
lower than our estimated IGE of 0.50 obtained using gross earnings and very close 
to the one obtained when using net earnings (0.43). 
3.5. Estimated rank-rank slopes 
Since the size of the intergenerational elasticity coefficient depends on the 
income dispersion in the two generations, we also estimate an alternative measure 
of intergenerational mobility: the rank-rank slope, a measure of the association 
between fathers’ relative position in their respective earnings distributions (Dahl & 
DeLeire, 2008). From a statistical point of view, rank-rank slopes are usually 
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intended to be more robust across samples and specifications (Chetty et al. 2014; 
Gregg et al. 2014).  
The intergenerational elasticity coefficient converges in probability to the 
correlation coefficient of log earnings times the ratio between the standard deviation 
in sons’ generation and that in fathers’ generation. Hence, given the connection 
between the intergenerational elasticity coefficient and the correlation coefficient 
and given that the correlation coefficient and the rank-rank slope are both scale-
invariant measures of relative mobility, we can easily see how the rank-rank slope 
is closely related to the intergenerational elasticity coefficient, but has the 
advantage to be “independent” from inequality within generations. In other words, 
the intergenerational elasticity coefficient may be affected by a change in inequality 
across the two generations, whereas the rank-rank slope is not.  
If our aim is to provide estimates of intergenerational mobility for Italy that can 
be compared with those of other countries, estimating rank to rank slopes may be a 
more suitable strategy. Since the level of inequality is not the same across countries, 
the rank-rank slope may provide a better picture of differences in intergenerational 
mobility.  
Rank-rank slopes are also more robust with respect to both the two key 
measurement issues, namely life-cycle and attenuation bias (Gregg et al. 2014). 
Life-cycle bias is mainly driven by mismeasurement of earnings gaps between 
individuals rather than positional inaccuracy along the earnings distribution. When 
using rank to rank slope we have also to deal with an attenuation bias smaller in 
magnitude since measurement errors and transitory shocks cause scale 
mismeasurement rather than positional inaccuracy in the earnings distribution.  
Rank-rank slopes are usually obtained by estimating the following equation:  
 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑓 + 𝜀                                                    (8) 
 
where 𝑝𝑐  is the percentile of sons’ earnings in their own distribution and 𝑝𝑓 is the 
percentile of fathers’. In this framework, an estimated 𝛾 of 0.5 means that the 
expected difference in ranks between sons would be about 5 percentiles if the 
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difference in ranks among their fathers was 10 percentiles. However, we are not 
able to estimate rank-rank slopes by simply re-categorizing earnings of the two 
generations since data on actual fathers’ earnings are not available. For this reason, 
we exploit a different approach consisting in two different steps. Firstly, we obtain 
a prediction of fathers’ earnings by exploiting the sample of pseudo-fathers and the 
same set of auxiliary variables used for obtaining TSTSLS estimates of the IGE. 
Secondly, predicted fathers’ earnings are percentile ranked so that we can estimate 
in the last step the following equation: 
 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛾?̂?𝑓 + 𝜀                                                  (9) 
 
where 𝑝𝑐  is the percentile of sons’ earnings in their own distribution and ?̂?𝑓 is the 
imputed percentile of fathers’ earnings. This approach, apart for the set of auxiliary 
variables exploited in the first step, is very close to that used by Olivetti and al. 
(2016) to obtain intergenerational and multigenerational imputed rank-rank slopes 
for the US36.  
From a statistical point of view, it is not easy to understand to what extent our 
imputed rank-rank slope can be compared to rank-rank slopes obtained by 
percentile ranking actual fathers’ earnings. Obviously, when we impute the 
percentile of the father from a predicted variable we are likely to make some errors 
in placing all fathers in the right percentile of their earnings distribution. For this 
reason, our estimates are likely to be affected by attenuation bias. However, this 
kind of positional measurement errors cannot be intended as “classical” (see Nybom 
and Stuhler, 2016) since both our dependent variable and the regressor in equation 
8 and 9 are uniformly distributed. This means that all statistical properties based on 
the assumption of normally distributed variables do not hold in our case. This is 
why we should exercise caution in comparing our imputed rank-rank slope to 
estimates obtained in previous studies for other countries. 
                                               
36 As in a previous article by Olivetti and Paserman (2015) they impute father’s income, which 
is unobserved, using the average income of fathers of children with a given first name. 
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Table 3.7 presents our findings and shows, in the case of multi-year averages for 
both generations, an estimated value of 0.254 which, interestingly is characterized 
by a lower reduction, compared to the IGE in table 3.5, when different yearly values 
of annual earnings are considered. Moreover, in table 3.8 we report imputed rank 
to rank slopes for net earnings. Since income taxation should affect earnings 
dispersion but not the position on the ladder of the income distribution, estimates 
of imputed rank to rank slopes do not change. These findings further confirm the 
robustness of the rank-rank slope.  
Table 3.7: Association between son’s and father’s gross earnings. Prime age sonsa. 
Rank to rank estimatesb 
 Observation span of fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
 5 years-5 years 5 years-1 year 1 year-5 years 1 year-1 year 
5 years-5 years 
Imputing zerosc 
Father’s earnings 0.254*** 0.237*** 0.228*** 0.217*** 0.249*** 
s.e. [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.025] 
Obs 1445 1365 1445 1365 1481 
R2 0.071 0.062 0.058 0.053 0.071 
R2 first stage 0.409 0.409 0.404 0.404 0.409 
a When observed in a 5 year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 2009.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage percentiles of father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross 
earnings on dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage percentiles of sons’ 
log annual gross earnings are regressed on predicted percentiles of fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of 
birth.  c 5-year average of sons’ earnings in age class 35-39 are computed assigning a zero value to sons who do not report 
earnings in administrative archives in a certain year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: elaborations on AD-SILC 
dataset 
 
However, it is not easy to compare our estimate to those obtained for other 
countries as this alternative measure of intergenerational association has a shorter 
history with respect to IGE and moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
evidence of rank-rank estimates obtained by computing fathers percentiles 
according to parental earnings obtained through an imputation procedure. 
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To the best of our knowledge Dahl & Delaire (2008) were pioneers in the usage 
of rank to rank: for the USA, they estimate a rank-rank slope of 0.289 taking 34 
years old sons and averaging fathers’ earnings from age 20 to 55 also including 
years of zero earnings. Still for the USA, Chetty et al. (2014) estimate a rank-rank 
slope of 0.34 whereas Mazumder (2015) estimate a rank-rank coefficient of 0.40 
when using 15 years of fathers’ earnings (0.31 if using a single year of father’s 
earnings).  Bratberg et al. (2017) in a recent work on cross country measures of 
intergenerational mobility display rank-rank estimate for several countries: 0.383 
for the US, 0.257 for Germany, 0.233 for Norway and 0.215 for Sweden. For the 
UK, we have rank-rank estimates from Gregg et al. (2014): 0.34 for sons aged 42 
and parental income measured when sons were 16.  
Table 3.8: Association between son’s and father’s earnings percentiles. Young 
sonsa. Rank to rank estimatesb 
 Observation span of fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
 5 years-5 years 5 years-1 year 1 year-5 years 1 year-1 year 
5 years-5 years 
Imputing zerosc 
Father’s earnings 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.169*** 0.177*** 0.148*** 
s.e. [0.0265] [0.0282] [0.0268] [0.0298] [0.0283] 
Obs 1395 1147 1395 1147 1410 
R2 0.038 0.058 0.034 0.056 0.042 
R2 first stage 0.409 0.409 0.404 0.404 0.409 
a When observed in a 5 year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 25-29 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 1999.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage percentiles of father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross 
earnings on dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage percentiles of sons’ 
log annual gross earnings are regressed on predicted percentiles of fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of 
birth.  c 5-year average of sons’ earnings in age class 25-29 are computed assigning a zero value to sons who do not report 
earnings in administrative archives in a certain year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: elaborations on AD-SILC 
dataset. 
It is quite striking how these results differ from those related to cross-country 
rankings based on the IGE. Even if rank-rank slope estimates are available only for 
few countries, and thus we cannot insert our results in a widely accepted cross-
110 
 
country ranking based on the rank-to rank slope, now distances between countries 
are reduced and Italy results to be not very distant from Nordic countries, with a 
level of mobility very close to the one reported for Germany.  
As in the case of estimated IGE, also rank to rank estimates appear to be affected 
by the life cycle bias. Indeed, when we consider sons aged 25-29 instead than 35-
39 (table 3.8), the estimated rank to rank coefficient falls to 0.181 when earnings of 
both generations are measured over a 5-year period. 
3.6. Intergenerational mechanisms 
A classical way to examine intergenerational mechanisms behind the 
intergenerational transmission of earnings is to re-estimate the equation 4 with some 
additional controls included in the vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑠  (see Raitano and Vona 2015): 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2?̂?𝑖
𝐹 + δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜃𝐵𝑖
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                  (10) 
                          
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑆  is the logarithm of sons’ earnings (a time average is used for sons with 
two or more observations),  ?̂?𝑖
𝐹 = 𝜃1 𝑍𝑖
𝐹 is the prediction of the logarithm of 
fathers’, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑠  is the vector of control variables, 𝐵𝑖
𝑠 is year of birth of son and 𝛽2 is 
the new estimated IGE.  
Among all possible channels of influence, we consider 8 categories of sons’ 
educational level, 27 categories of occupations (according to 2 digits ISCO), the 
working status (private employee, public employee, self-employed, professional or 
parasubordinate worker) and work experience measured as the number of working 
weeks since they entry into activity. We consider three different models, where 5-
year average earnings for both generations are considered: in the first only son’s 
educational attainment is included in the vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 ; the second one includes both 
sons’ educational levels, occupational qualification and working status; the last 
adds experience and thus considers all mediating variables. 
The assumption is that if a mediating variable is positively correlated with both 
fathers’ and sons’ earnings, the estimated elasticity will fall once this control is 
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included in the regression. Therefore, the difference between ?̂? obtained by 
estimating equation 4 (our baseline) and ?̂?2 can be interpret as the fraction of the 
elasticity associated to a single mediating factor. However, this is true only if this 
mediating variable included in the vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑠  is not correlated with the error term. 
Conversely, if the mediating variable is positively (negatively) correlated with other 
unobservable factors that influence sons’ earnings, the coefficient ?̂?2 is upward 
(downward) biased and the channel of influence is overestimated (underestimated). 
Figure 3.2: T2TSLS estimated coefficient of the association between son’s and 
father’s earnings, including sons’ outcomes among the covariatesa. Fathers and sons 
observed for 5 yearsb. 
 
a Dummies on sons’ year of birth are included among covariates in all estimated models.  b Fathers and sons are observed, 
respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. 90% confidence intervals. Source: 
elaborations on AD-SILC dataset 
Estimated elasticities obtained by means of equation 10 are presented in figure 
3.2 together with their 90% confidence intervals. Estimates suggest that including 
all three control variables together is the only result statistically different from the 
baseline estimate (when no sons’ characteristics are controlled for).  
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On the contrary, the estimated IGE obtained by including either sons’ 
educational levels or educational levels and occupation and work status are not 
statistically different from the baseline. These results provide some evidence that 
higher income of fathers’ may influence their sons’ economic outcomes in ways 
other than through the mere investment human capital. More specifically, sons from 
lower income families may obtain less stable occupations which negatively affects 
their experience and may reduce their gross annual earnings, as shown in the “full 
model” 
Figure 3.3: Rank to rank estimated coefficient of the association between son’s and 
father’s earnings percentiles, including sons’ outcomes among the covariatesa. 
Fathers and sons observed for 5 yearsb. 
 
a Dummies on sons’ year of birth are included among covariates in all estimated models.  b Fathers and sons are observed, 
respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. 90% confidence intervals. Source: 
elaborations on AD-SILC dataset. 
Results obtained by estimating equation 10 are confirmed when we examine the 
relative importance of the three mechanisms by means of rank-rank estimates, 
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carried out starting from predicted incomes obtained by the two-stage procedure 
(Figure 3.3). As in the case of elasticity, we compare our baseline rank-rank slopes 
estimate with those obtained using different set of controls: first we add to our 
baseline model dummies on education, then both dummies on education and work 
status and, in the last model, dummies for education, work status, and effective 
experience. Education, again, seems to capture only a small fraction of the 
intergenerational earnings persistence. In the next section, we will deepen these 
results by means of a decomposition analysis. 
3.7. Decomposition approach 
A further detailed way to examine the role of mechanisms driving the 
intergenerational correlation of earnings is to exploit the sequential decomposition 
approach suggested by Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007) and further 
developeded in Blanden et al. (2014).  
Following Blanden et al. (2014) we decompose the IGE into two parts: the first 
one is how much of the father-son earnings relationship is accounted for by 
transmission factors – that is, some sons’ outcomes, e.g. education or occupation, 
that are affected by parental characteristics and then influence sons’ earnings –, 
whereas the second one is the unexplained persistence in earnings that is not 
transmitted through the considered mediating variables. The part of the 
intergenerational persistence explained by the pathway factors is the product of two 
measures: the relationship between fathers’ earnings and the pathway factor and its 
monetary return in the labour market.  
Among all possible transmission mechanism, this section focuses on two 
mediating variables: educational attainments and occupational qualification. The 
first step of the decomposition method consists in estimating the univariate 
relationship between sons’ educational attainments and the prediction of logarithm 
of fathers’ earnings:  
 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼𝑒𝑑 + 𝜆𝑒𝑑?̂?𝑓 + 𝑒1𝑖                                             (11) 
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Then, to combine the estimated association with the return of educational 
attainments in the labour market, the logarithm of sons’ earnings is regressed on 
sons’ educational attainments. We control for the prediction of the logarithm of 
fathers’ earnings, thus estimating the effect of education on sons’ earnings 
independent of that estimated in equation 11: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 𝜔1 + 𝜌𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐 ?̂?𝑓 + 𝜈1𝑖                         (12) 
 
It follows that the IGE estimated in equation 4 (i.e. our baseline) can be decomposed 
into two different parts: 
 
𝛽 = 𝜆𝑒𝑑𝜌𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐                                           (13) 
 
where 𝜆𝑒𝑑𝜌𝑒𝑑  is the indirect effect of fathers’ earnings on sons’ through the 
educational channel and 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐  is the unexplained persistence in earnings that is not 
transmitted through education. 
Then, we account for occupational attainments only by estimating in equation 
14 the association between occupational status and father’s earnings and in equation 
15 its monetary pay-off in the labour market: 
 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼𝑜𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝑜𝑐𝑐?̂?𝑓 + 𝑒1𝑖                                     (14) 
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 𝜔2 + 𝜌𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐 ?̂?𝑓 + 𝜈2𝑖                               (15) 
 
In this case, the decomposition becomes: 
 
𝛽 = 𝜆𝑜𝑐𝑐𝜌𝑜𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐                                          (16) 
 
Moreover, we want to consider the interaction between educational attainments 
and occupational choices. Therefore, once we have estimated the relationship of 
each variables with fathers’ earnings, we estimate an equation where we consider 
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together the return to education and occupation in the labour market. In the next 
equation 17, we obtain the monetary pay-off of each variable, conditional on the 
others.  
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑠 = 𝜔1 + 𝜌𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑑𝑖
𝑠 + 𝜌𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑖
𝑠 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐 ?̂?𝑓 + 𝜈3𝑖                          (17) 
 
Now β can be decomposed as follows: 
 
𝛽 = 𝜆𝑒𝑑𝛾𝑒𝑑 + 𝜆𝑜𝑐𝑐𝛾𝑜𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐                                        (18) 
 
where we can distinguish the component of beta accounted for by educational 
attainments and the part of beta accounted for by occupational outcomes. Thus, 
𝜆𝑒𝑑𝛾𝑒𝑑 − 𝜆𝑒𝑑𝜌𝑒𝑑   gives the extent to which the influence of education is transmitted 
through occupation.  
According to Hirvonen (2010), in order to obtain consistent estimates for the 
coefficients of the two mediating variables, error terms of equation 11 and equation 
14 must be uncorrelated with the error term in the return equation 17. However, this 
assumption is likely to be violated since both educational attainments and 
occupational status could be related to other variables, such as cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, education quality and other hardly observables factors as, for 
example, social networks and family ties. Unfortunately, our dataset does not 
provide information on education quality (e.g. marks or field of study), on cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills and social network (e.g. channels used to find job) to 
control for other sons’ characteristics.  
Moreover, consider that our decomposition approach cannot be directly 
compared to that proposed by Blanden et al. (2007) and Blanden et al. (2014) as we 
are using imputed instead of actual fathers’ earnings. In fact, estimated 𝜆𝑒𝑑  and 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐  may be biased due to unobservables included in the error terms of equation 11 
and 12, that are not captured by the set of auxiliary variables used to predict fathers’ 
earnings. More specifically, there could be some variables (e. g. soft skills, social 
networks, cultural factors, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities) that are positively 
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correlated to earnings of the two generations (i.e. they are in the error term of our 
equation 12) and to educational attainments of offspring. Therefore, we are likely 
to be underestimating (overestimating) the mediating role of education if imputed 
earnings are less (more) correlated to the mediating variable than actual earnings 
(i.e. imputed earnings are less correlated to unobservables in equation 12 which are 
correlated to educational attainments)   
With all this in mind, we proceed to decompose intergenerational mobility into 
different channels. Educational attainments of sons included in the decomposition 
analysis are provided by the 2005 wave of the IT-SILC survey. More specifically, 
educational levels are coded according to the five main International Standard 
Classification of Education levels (ISCED). Here we rely on a four-modal 
distribution of education: “tertiary graduates”, “high-school graduates”, “middle 
school graduates” and “elementary”. However, when we estimate the univariate 
relationship between fathers’ earnings and sons’ education, exclusive dummies 
would lead to ambiguity in the interpretation of the coefficient for the middle 
category. Thus, following Blanden et al. (2014) we redefine our dummy on 
education as equal to one for all those who are at the relevant education level or 
above: “tertiary graduates”, “at least high-school” and “at least middle school”. In 
this case the coefficient must be interpreted as the incremental effect of that 
education level compared to the next lower level of education.  
Regarding occupational status, it was originally classified according to ISCO 
codes: the lowest ISCO code indicates the highest occupational quality.  We convert 
ISCO categories in a four-modal distribution of occupation: “higher managerial and 
professional” (corporate managers, professionals, legislators), “lower managerial 
and professional” (associate professionals, managers of small enterprises), 
“intermediate” (clerks and service workers), “bottom occupation” (assemblers, 
agricultural, crafts, elementary occupations). As with education, we then redefine 
our variables equal to one for all those who are at the relevant occupational level or 
above37. 
                                               
37 We use less categories for both mediating variables than we did in the previous sections for 
computational reasons 
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The decomposition analysis is carried out on IGE estimates run on 5-year 
earnings averages for both generations (see section 3.4). Results are summarized in 
Table 3.9. The overall IGE can be decomposed into the relationship between 
father’s earnings and the mediating variables (λ) multiplied by the return to those 
variables in the labor market (γ), plus the unexplained persistence in earnings that 
is not transmitted by those factors.  Column (i) considers only education as 
mediating variable, column (ii) only occupation and column (iii) consider the 
interaction between the two variables. 
Table 3.9: Decomposition: share of β explained by mediating variables. 
 
Author's elaboration based on the AD_SILC dataset.  
 
factor (i) (ii) (iii) 
college degree 0.022  0.011 
at least highschool 0.047  0.035 
at least middle school 0.018  0.018 
Total educational outcomes 0.087  0.064 
higher manangerial or professionals  0.004 0.001 
at least lower managerial or professional  0.021 0.017 
at least intermediate  0.026 0.017 
total occupational outcomes  0.051 0.035 
total accounted for (λ*γ) 0.087 0.051 0.099 
not accounted for 0.409 0.445 0.397 
total 0.496 0.496 0.496 
% through ed.outcomes 17.61%  12.91% 
% through occupational outcomes  10.34% 7.08% 
% of total 17.61% 10.34% 19.99% 
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Following Blanden (2014) we add to the full decomposition, model (iii), the two 
variables in the order in which they occur in the aging process. The sum of the 
explained and unexplained component of β is 0.496, that is the total association 
between fathers’ earnings and sons’. In model (i) we first include only education 
that explains 17.6% of the intergenerational persistence, whereas around 82% can 
be accounted as the direct effect of father’s earnings. In model (ii) we include only 
occupations that accounts for almost 10.3% of the intergenerational elasticity 
coefficient. When in model (iii), our complete decomposition, we include both 
education and occupation, the magnitude of the indirect effect implies that around 
20% of total effect is mediate by education and occupation. The share of persistence 
accounted for by the former decreases from 17.6% to 12.9%. Thus, the two 
mechanisms are clearly correlated and occupation takes over some of the 
explanatory power of education. This means that parental background exerts its 
effect on education, education effects sorting into occupation and occupation 
influences earnings. When we move from model (i) to model (iii) we notice that the 
proportion of the intergenerational elasticity coefficients explained increase only by 
2.4 percentage points thus occupation contributes directly only marginally in 
explaining intergenerational persistence. 
In table 3.10 we report the estimates that are behind the decomposition presented 
in table 3.9. The first column reports the λ coefficient estimated in the set of 
regression of the relationship between the mediating variables and father’s earnings. 
The second pair of columns presents the γ coefficients from the single regression 
of log sons’ earnings on the set of included pathway variables. Columns from two 
to four display the γ coefficient from the regression of sons’ earnings on the 
mediating factors: equation (i) regress sons’ earnings on education, equation (ii) on 
occupation and equation (iii) on both educational and occupational levels. 
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Table 3.10: Detailed decomposition results 
 
association with father's earnings (λ) return in the labour market (γ) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Education:   
college 
0.217 0.1024  0.0501 
[0.0331] [0.0520]  [0.0586] 
     
at least high school 
0.2752 0.1704  0.1262 
[0.0376] [0.0382]  [0.0383] 
     
at least middle school 
0.065 0.2803  0.2836 
[0.0161] [0.1119]  [0.1071] 
Occupation:   
high managerial and professional 
0.0964  0.0421 0.0155 
[0.0277]  [0.0685] [0.0750] 
     
at least low managerial and professional 
0.1955  0.1094 0.0869 
[0.0414]  [0.0541] [0.0536] 
     
at least intermediate 
0.2392  0.108 0.0695 
[0.0420]  [0.0476] [0.0476] 
Author's elaboration based on the AD_SILC dataset.  
3.8. Concluding remarks 
This chapter provides new evidence on the degree of earnings correlation across 
generations in Italy, which is usually considered as a low mobility country (Piraino, 
2007; Mocetti, 2007).  New results are provided by relying on the AD-SILC, a very 
rich panel dataset built merging the 2005 wave of the Italian sample of the Survey 
on Income and Living Condition (IT-SILC) conducted by ISTAT (the National 
Italian Statistical Institute) with information collected from administrative archives 
managed by the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) that cover individual 
120 
 
earnings histories from the moment they enter the labour market to the end of 2013. 
The advantages of exploiting this dataset are twofold. Firstly, unlike previous 
estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) for Italy obtained by 
using net earnings, we are able to examine the extent of intergenerational mobility 
in the labour market which is not mediated by the redistributive effect of taxes and, 
once reconstructed net earnings, we can compare the two measures. Secondly, we 
can rely on a large panel dimension which permits to obtain a measure of earnings 
which is less affected by lifecycle and attenuation biases. 
As in previous studies on intergenerational economic mobility in Italy, we 
exploited the two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) method to obtain 
different measures of intergenerational earnings associations. Nonetheless, unlike 
previous studies for Italy, we exploited the large panel dimension of the dataset to 
measure earnings over a 5–year period both in the first and second stage of the 
TSTSLS approach. Moreover, our auxiliary variables have a higher number of 
categories, thus allowing us to obtain a higher predictive power in the first stage. 
Results showed an IGE of 0.496 for gross earnings and an IGE of 0.428 for net 
earnings. Both the two measures of mobility become lower if estimates are obtained 
by using point in time measures of earnings of the two generations or if earnings of 
sons are taken when they are at early stages of their careers.  
We also provided estimates of rank-rank slopes for Italy that proved to be more 
robust across different specifications, samples and measures of earnings. Since this 
measure remove the “within generation” inequality component, it is particularly 
suited for cross-country comparisons. However, rank-rank slope measures are 
available only for few countries. Therefore, it is not easy to make international 
rankings based on this measure of intergenerational economic mobility. In any case, 
according to our estimated rank-rank slopes, conversely on what we find for the 
IGE, Italy is not so distant from Nordic European countries and very closed to the 
level of mobility of Germany. Therefore, it is highly desirable for future research 
to provide, besides the IGE, also measures based on the rank to rank slope.   
Education is usually recognized as the most prominent mechanism affecting the 
intergenerational transmission of income from parents to children.  We presented 
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additional estimates including as regressors children characteristics affected by 
parental circumstances – e.g. education, occupation – to assess whether a residual 
influence of parental background still emerges when these characteristics are 
controlled for. 
Furthermore, we also applied the decomposition method proposed by Blanden 
et al. (2014) in order to compare the role played by education and occupation as 
transmission mechanisms of intergenerational inequality. We found that, when 
considered together, education and occupation account for around 20% of father-
son earnings relationship: education contributes to 12.9% of the earnings 
persistence, while occupation account for around 7.1%.  
Thanks to the sequential decomposition we assessed that the proportion of β 
accounted for by education becomes smaller when occupational attainments, that 
occur later in life with respect to the educational ones, are included. Therefore, part 
of the effect of education is absorbed by occupational choices. Considering 
education alone, as the only transmission mechanism, may overstate its explanatory 
power of the persistence of socio-economic outcomes (Hirvonen, 2010). Even when 
we considered both education and occupation, it is highly likely that the part of the 
intergenerational elasticity coefficient ascribed to education, still conceals some of 
the explanatory power that should be ascribed to other mechanisms (e.g. soft and 
hard skills). Therefore, it is likely that we are overestimating the effect of the 
education and these results should be interpreted as an upper bound. The role of 
education in Italy, compared to that found by Blanden at al. (2014) for the UK and 
the US is very limited and it is even more limited if our results should be interpreted 
as an upper bound.  
D’Addio (2007) suggests that in many country – among which we find both USA 
and UK -   high skill premia are associated with low levels of intergenerational 
mobility. However, this picture does not fit for Italy, where we can find the 
coexistence of low labor market rewards for education and a high level of 
intergenerational persistence. Recent literature posits that in Italy is possible to 
detect a decrease in the earnings differential between educated and less-educated 
workers (Lovaglio & Verzillo 2016; Naticchioni et al. 2010). In particular, most 
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recent cohorts of high-skilled workers are suffering much heavier earnings penalty 
with respect to unskilled workers (Naticchioni et al. 2016). Thus, low wage premia 
for highly qualified workers may disincentive family in investing in their children 
education. This is probably the reason why education accounts for a limited part of 
the intergenerational resemblance of earnings, that is more likely to be driven by 
other mechanisms such as the importance of family connections and social ties in 
finding highly rewarded jobs (Raitano & Vona, 2015)  
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 Appendix 
Tab. A1: Association between son’s and father’s earnings. Prime age sons. Fathers 
and sons observed for 5 yearsa. OLS estimates in the second stage dropping one 
coefficient at a time in the first stageb 
 Regressors dropped in the first stage 
 Education dummies Occupation dummies 
Dummy on 
self-employment 
Dummies on 
region of work 
Father’s earnings 0.489*** 0.466*** 0.640*** 0.370*** 
s.e. [0.055] [0.057] [0.064] [0.057] 
Obs 1445 1445 1445 1445 
R2 0.055 0.052 0.069 0.031 
R2 first stage 0.380 0.351 0.282 0.374 
a When observed in a 5-year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 2009.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross earnings on 
dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage sons’ log annual gross earnings are 
regressed on predicted fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of birth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: 
elaborations on AD-SILC dataset. 
Tab. A2: Association between son’s and father’s earnings. Prime age sons. Fathers 
and sons observed for 5 yearsa. Rank to rank estimates dropping one coefficient at 
a time in the first stageb 
 Regressors dropped in the first stage 
 Education dummies Occupation dummies 
Dummy 
on self-employment 
Dummies on 
region of work 
Father’s earnings 0.244*** 0.237*** 0.262*** 0.187*** 
s.e. [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
Obs 1445 1445 1445 1445 
R2 0.066 0.063 0.075 0.042 
R2 first stage 0.380 0.351 0.282 0.374 
a When observed in a 5-year period, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, when aged 40-44 in the period 1980-1988 
and 35-39 in the period 2005-2013. When observed in a single year, fathers and sons are considered, respectively, in 1985 
and 2009.  b TSTSLS are carried out: in the first stage father’s earnings are imputed regressing log annual gross earnings on 
dummies on education, occupation, self-employment, region of work; in the second stage sons’ log annual gross earnings are 
regressed on predicted fathers’ log earnings, also controlling for sons’ year of birth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: 
elaborations on AD-SILC dataset 
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General Conclusions 
Measuring economic disparities by using net wealth rather than income is not an 
easy task. Data on all real and financial assets are rarely available and with many 
differences across countries. For instance, including pension assets or valuables 
other than vehicles in the computation of net wealth may completely change 
international rankings. Moreover, the harmonization process is still not perfect and 
some cross-countries differences remain, starting with the number of years for 
which data are available or with differences in the degree of wealthy households 
over-sampling, used to mitigate the underestimation of wealth in the upper tail of 
the distribution.  
Despite all measurement issues, at any point of time wealth is likely to capture 
differences in lifetime economic resources better than income because it is less 
affected by transitory shocks, strongly associated to cumulate earnings and directly 
transmitted from one generation to the next by means of donations or bequests. For 
all these characteristics, economic mobility across generations may be better 
measured by using wealth instead of income since suitable data which cover two 
generations over their entire lifecycle are usually not available.  
Unfortunately, only few studies compare intergenerational correlations in 
income to intergenerational correlations in wealth by selecting two generations at 
median ages. Nevertheless, these studies show that economic mobility measured by 
correlations in income is likely to be overestimated if earnings of the two 
generations are not properly averaged over many years. Introducing wealth may, at 
least partially, reduce this kind of underestimation without requiring the use of very 
large panel which cover two generations over their entire lifecycle. However, 
further evidence is needed to confirm these results since estimates of mobility 
which use wealth as a measure of economic status are very recent and hardly 
comparable by country and age of the two generations.  
The second chapter of the thesis provided a first estimate of the intergenerational 
wealth elasticity and rank-rank slope in Italy using data from the Bank of Italy’s 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth. To overcome the lack of information 
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about parental wealth, the two-sample two-stage least squares methodology has 
been implemented by selecting a sample of offspring, that report some socio-
economic information about their actual parents, and an independent sample of 
pseudo-parents in their 40s 
The resulted intergenerational wealth elasticity of 0.451 and rank-rank slope of 
0.349 revealed that Italy, as well as the United States and Sweden, is a country with 
a lower degree of wealth mobility across generations than other Scandinavian 
countries or France.  Moreover, the degree of wealth mobility in Italy appeared to 
be particularly low at the top and at the bottom of the wealth distribution and in the 
southern part of the country where estimated elasticity resulted to be 0.621. 
To test the pattern of the intergenerational wealth correlation over the children’s 
lifecycle, I re-estimated the intergenerational wealth elasticity and the rank-rank 
slope by using three different samples of offspring by age. Results confirmed 
previous evidence showing a U-shaped pattern of the wealth correlation as a 
function of offspring’s age with higher intergenerational wealth correlations when 
offspring are taken when they are at the beginning of their adulthood or in their 40s. 
However, further evidence is needed to assess the degree of intergenerational 
wealth mobility by selecting older offspring. 
The decomposition of the intergenerational association into different mediating 
mechanisms showed that labour income of the second generation, among other 
mediating factors such as preferences and bequests or inter-vivos transfers, seems 
to be associated with most of the overall wealth association across generations. 
More specifically, while the intergenerational wealth elasticity became 43.7 percent 
lower when labour income of offspring is included as a control, a smaller fraction 
of the wealth association seemed to be related to intergenerational correlations in 
saving propensity or returns on investments.  
The last chapter, which is part of a research work with Michele Raitano and 
Teresa Barbieri, provides new evidence on the degree of earnings correlation across 
generations in Italy. New results are obtained by relying on the AD-SILC, a very 
rich panel dataset built merging the 2005 wave of the Italian sample of the Survey 
on Income and Living Condition (IT-SILC) conducted by ISTAT (the National 
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Italian Statistical Institute) with information collected from administrative archives 
managed by the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) that cover individual 
earnings histories from the moment they enter the labour market to the end of 2013. 
As in previous studies on intergenerational economic mobility in Italy, we 
exploited the two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) method to obtain 
different measures of intergenerational earnings associations. Nonetheless, unlike 
previous studies for Italy, we exploited the large panel dimension of the dataset to 
measure earnings over a 5–year period both in the first and second stage of the 
TSTSLS approach. Moreover, our auxiliary variables have a higher number of 
categories, thus allowing us to obtain a higher predictive power in the first stage. 
Results showed an IGE of 0.496 for gross earnings and an IGE of 0.428 for net 
earnings. The two measures both become lower if estimates are obtained by using 
point in time measures of earnings of the two generations or young sons.   
We also provided estimates of rank-rank slopes for Italy that proved to be more 
robust across different specifications, samples and measures of earnings. According 
to our results, conversely on what we find for the IGE, Italy is not so distant from 
Nordic European countries and very closed to the level of mobility of Germany. 
Therefore, it is highly desirable for future research to provide, besides the IGE, also 
measures of mobility based on the rank-rank slope.   
Finally, we presented additional estimates including as regressors children 
characteristics affected by parental circumstances – e.g. education, occupation – to 
assess whether a residual influence of parental background still emerges when these 
characteristics are controlled for. Additionally, we also applied the decomposition 
method proposed by Blanden et al. (2014) in order to compare the role played by 
education and occupation as transmission mechanisms of intergenerational 
inequality. We found that, when considered together, education and occupation 
account for only around 20% of father-son earnings relationship: education 
contributes to 12.9% of the earnings persistence, while occupation account for 
around 7.1%.  
 
